Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, Part 2 by Marcus, Paul & Waye, Vicki
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2010
Australia and the United States: Two Common
Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds,
Part 2
Paul Marcus
William & Mary Law School, pxmarc@wm.edu
Vicki Waye
Copyright c 2010 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Marcus, Paul and Waye, Vicki, "Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, Part 2"
(2010). Faculty Publications. Paper 583.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/583
TULANE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
VOLUME 18 SPRING 2010 No.2 
Australia and the United States: Two Common 
Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 
Part 2* 
Vicki Wayet 
Paul Marcus** 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 336 
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION •......................................................... 340 
A. The United States ............................................................. 340 
B. Australia ........................................................................... 346 
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY·········································································· 353 
A. Australia ........................................................................... 353 
B. The United States ............................................................. 360 
1. Overview ......................................................................... 360 
2. What Is Jeopardy? .......................................................... 362 
3. Protections ...................................................................... 363 
4. Double Jeopardy's Limitations ...................................... 364 
N. SENTENCING····················································································· 366 
A. The United States ............................................................. 366 
1. Introduction .................................................................... 366 
2. History of Sentencing in the United States ................... 367 
3. Impact of Severe Sentencing ......................................... 372 
a. Economic Impact ................................................... 374 
b. Societal Impact ....................................................... 375 
4. Recent Developments .................................................... 375 
* © 201 0 Vicki Waye and Paul Marcus. With thanks to Trenton Brown, Allison Huson, 
Elizabeth Mercuri, Courtney Mills, Andrea Priest, and Kristin Smith for their excellent research 
assistance. 
t Professor of Law, University of South Australia. 
** Haynes Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. 
335 
336 TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 18 
B. Australia ........................................................................... 3 77 
v. ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING ............................................................. 385 
A. United States ..................................................................... 385 
1. Drug Courts .................................................................... 386 
2. Other Alternative Courts ................................................ 390 
B. Australia ........................................................................... 391 
1. Introduction .................................................................... 391 
2. Australian Drug Courts .................................................. 391 
3. Indigenous Courts .......................................................... 395 
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION ........................................................... 396 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Six years ago we considered a number · of similarities and 
differences in the criminal justice systems of Australia and the United 
States. 1 Our investigation found that the regulatory framework for 
criminal procedure is similar in both systems, and that both systems 
promote the presumption of innocence and impose requirements 
designed to ensure the voluntariness of confessions.2 Still, each system 
approaches some key matters on very different bases. These include the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, the right to counsel, the 
transparency of jury deliberations, and the issue of entrapment in 
criminal investigation. 3 In our view, U.S. jurisprudence is "rights-
oriented," while Australian jurisprudence is "official-centric.'"' Without a 
constitutional basis for rights development and a proclivity for 
jurisprudence designed to protect the integrity of the courts and their 
processes rather than individual rights, Australian courts are far less 
likely than their U.S. counterparts to exclude illegally obtained evidence 
and confessions, to limit evidence (or dismiss charges) obtained by way 
of entrapment, or to open trials to public scrutiny. 
However, we did not simply point out the constitutional differences 
between our two countries as an explanation for the different paths taken. 
We offered the thesis that the embedding of rights in the United States 
Constitution and the subsequent development of rights-based 
jurisprudence governing criminal investigation and process-some of 
which, like the doctrine of entrapment, are wholly independent of 
l. See Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common 
Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TuL. J.INT'L & CaMP. L. 27 (2004). 
2. See id at 28. 
3. Seeidatll4-l6. 
4. /datll4. 
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constitutional rights-sprang from a different history and culture than 
that which developed in Australia post-British colonization. 5 The 
Framers of the Australian Constitution drafted in the late 1890s 
deliberately rejected embedding rights out of the belief that the English 
system of responsible government was a sufficient assurance of civil 
liberty.6 They thought that the imposition of rights would only benefit 
alien elements in Australian society. By contrast, in the United States, 
the revolutionary context in which the Constitution was formed resulted 
in a compact between the State and the people with a full articulation of 
rights, lest the State should use its power to ride roughshod over 
individual liberties. 7 In other words, it was the divergent cultures of 
colonization and revolution, and reliance upon state beneficence versus 
fear of state tyranny, which led to our constitutional differences and 
contrasting approaches to criminal justice. 
The purpose of this Article is to investigate other areas of criminal 
justice and to consider whether our thesis continues to operate as an 
explanation for the different approaches taken in each jurisdiction. This 
Article will examine four key aspects of criminal justice in the two 
nations: prosecutorial discretion, especially in charging and plea 
bargaining; double jeopardy; sentencing; and alternatives to incarceration 
as punishment. 
The investigation is timely for a number of reasons. First, following 
a change of government in 2007, Australia embarked upon a consultation 
process to examine whether Australia should have a Bill of Rights. A 
National Human Rights Consultation Committee was formed to convene 
a series of community roundtables, to develop submissions, and to 
deliver a report that is currently being considered by the Australian 
governmene Since our first article one Australian state, Victoria, and the 
Australian Capital Territory, Canberra, have already enacted legislation 
designed to protect and promote human rights.9 The rights set out in 
these statutes do not endorse the adoption of the United States' approach 
to evidence obtained illegally, entrapment, and so on; moreover, the rights 
5. Id at 116. 
6. Id 
7. Id at 100. 
8. See AUSTRALIA NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION COMMIITEE, NATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsconsultation. 
gov.au (follow "Report" hyperlink). The committee is headed by Jesuit cleric and law professor 
Frank Brennan. See Australia National Hwnan Rights Consultation Committee, Father Frank 
Brennan AO, http://www.hwnanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.ns17Page!Who_Father 
Frank:BrennanAO-Chair (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
9. Charter ofHwnan Rights and Responsibilities Act, 2006 (Viet. Acts); Hwnan Rights 
Act, 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr. Laws). 
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themselves are subject to limitation and qualification. Nevertheless, the 
fact of their articulation suggests that Australia's idiosyncratic position 
apropos of civil liberties in the common law world is undergoing change, 
albeit slow and incremental. 
The second development worth noting since our original article was 
published is a series of decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
raising questions about the reach of the exclusionary rule, something we 
saw earlier as a fundamental difference between the two systems. Two of 
the decisions give grave concern about the direction of U.S. law and the 
exclusionary rule, while two others follow a much more rights-based 
approach. 
The first case is Herring v. Umted States. 10 In a split decision, the 
Court relaxed the application of the exclusionary rule regarding search 
and seizure without a valid warrant.n The police officers who found 
drugs and firearms had acted on the basis of inaccurate information 
concerning the existence of an outstanding warrant included in a 
neighboring county database. 12 Although the majority Justices accepted 
that there had been a Fourth Amendment violation, they characterized the 
error as a matter of "isolated negligence" rather than systematic error or 
reckless disregard of constitutional requirements. 13 Releasing the 
defendant on such a minor violation, while the police were in possession 
of a warrant, seriously undermined the criminal justice system. 14 
In Hudson v. Michigan, 15 too, the United States Supreme Court was 
far more willing to limit the use of the exclusionary rule to head off 
police misconduct. The Justices there held that a violation of the "knock-
and-announce" rule16 does not require suppression of evidence found in a 
search in which an otherwise valid warrant was improperly executed. 17 
Focusing on the key rationale for the exclusionary rule-deterrence-the 
Court determined that suppression would not serve the interest protected 
by the constitutional guarantee against unannounced entry. 18 Though the 
knock-and-announce rule protected property and privacy, for the 
10. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
11. Id at 702-03. 
12. Id at 698. 
13. Id (reasoning that when the error was due to such "isolated negligence;' the benefits 
of deterring police misconduct by excluding illegally obtained evidence were clearly outweighed 
by the substantial social cost of allowing the defendant to go free). 
14. Id at 704. 
15. 547 u.s. 586 (2006). 
16. The basic principle was first announced in Uilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927,931-32 
(1995). 
17. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594. 
18. Id 
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majority this interest did not outweigh the social costs of excluding 
relevant incriminating evidence when the police were acting pursuant to 
a legitimate warrant.'9 
The direction of the United States Supreme Court as to a rights-
based criminal justice system becomes much less clear when one views 
its most recent pronouncements in the area. The so-called McNabb-
Mallory rule,20 developed in the 1940s and 50s, requires an arrested 
person to be brought before a judicial officer "without unnecessary 
delay."21 If the rule is not satisfied, any statement obtained from the 
accused during the delay must be suppressed. 22 The holdings were 
actually based upon the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-not the 
Constitution-which were seemingly changed by Congress in a 
legislative enactment in 2006.23 The Court in both McNabb and Mallory 
was careful to note that it was implying the sanction from the purpose of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the impact of the 
subsequent changes to the federal statute was unclear until the Court's 
decision in Corley v. United States. 24 In that case, the five-Justice 
majority held that if the suspect was not brought before a magistrate 
within the six-hour time period specified-unless there was an 
emergency-any resulting confession would be inadmissible. 25 
The other case to raise questions about whether the United States 
Supreme Court truly intends to step back from its strong support for a 
mandatory exclusionary rule is Aniona v. Gane6 After the defendant 
had stepped out of his car, officers arrested and handcuffed him.27 They 
19. Jd at 599 (stating that "massive deterrence" was not necessary against unannounced 
entries). 
20. So named for the cases of McNabb v. Um"ted States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and 
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
21. Mallory, 354 U.S. at 452. 
22. Jd at 453. 
23. Jd at 452-53; see 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (2006). 
24. 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009). 
25. Jd at 1571. The language here is quite strong, and reaffirming of an earlier period: 
In a world without McNabb-Mallory, federal agents would be free to question 
suspects for extended periods before bringing them out in the open, and we have 
always known what custodial secrecy leads to. . . . No one with any smattering of the 
history of 20th-century dictatorships needs a lecture on the subject, and we understand 
the need even within our own system to take care against going too far. "[C]ustodial 
police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual," ... and 
there is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures can induce a frighteningly 
high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed. 
Id at 1570 (citations omitted). 
26. 129AS.Ct.1710, 1714(2009). 
27. /dat1715. 
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then searched the car and found drugs.28 The trial court justified the 
arrest under a well-established doctrine that allows for a search of the 
defendant and the area under his immediate control at the time of the 
arrese9 The majority affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's reversal of 
Gant's conviction, ruling the search invalid.30 They found that the "search 
incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or a valid 
suspicion of evidence in the vehicle.31 Because the defendant had left the 
vehicle before the police went into it, the search of the vehicle was not 
directly connected to the arrest and, without that justification, violated 
the Constitution.32 
By tempering the application of the exclusionary rule according to 
the degree of police culpability involved and tying this to the integrity of 
the criminal justice system, the decisions in Hening and Hudson appear 
far more analogous to the Australian official-centric jurisprudence 
examined in our original article than was previously observed. Yet, the 
Supreme Court's recent Corley and Gant rulings seemingly return the 
Americans to a more traditional view of individual rights and deterrence 
of overzealous law enforcement. 
The question for us here is whether the various recent developments 
in our respective nations signal substantive shifts away from the views we 
expressed in our first article. We do not think that they do. We turn now 
to four distinct, yet related, areas in an attempt to shed light on this 
subject. 
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
A. The United States 
The great reach of prosecutorial discretion is seen most prominently 
in the plea bargaining process.33 The American criminal justice system 
28. Id 
29. Id (relying on the doctrine of a "search incident to arrest"). The major case involving 
this doctrine is Chime] v. Califomia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
30. Gan~ 129A S. Ct. at 1719. 
31. Id 
32. Id Relying on its well-established case law, the Court held as follows: 
Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after 
the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle [unless, 
because of] circumstances unique to the automobile context . . . it is reasonable to 
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle. 
Id at 1714. 
33. Though, certainly, the impact of great prosecutorial discretion is not limited to this 
area. The American prosecutor, for instance, retains tremendous power regarding pretrial 
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has become a process of negotiations more than a guaranteed trial by 
jury.34 Today, plea bargaining disposes of more than 90% of criminal 
cases before a jury panel is even selected.35 Plea bargaining is the 
process by which the lawyer for an accused criminal defendant and the 
prosecutor negotiate a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case, 
which is subject to the approval of the court holding jurisdiction over the 
matter. Such a deal prevents both parties from going to trial. Plea 
bargaining has evolved from an accepted, though limited, alternative to 
trial by a jury of one's peers to the primary and favored method of 
disposing criminal cases in the United States. It continues to be hotly 
debated. 
Proponents of plea bargains argue that there are benefits for all 
participants in the system: prosecutors, defendants, and judges. 
Prosecutors must allocate their finite resources over an ever-expanding 
criminal docket. With the benefit of pleas, government attorneys are 
given the option of summarily disposing of cases that are less serious, 
allowing them to concentrate their efforts on graver issues that may 
discovery. See Symposium, Prosecuton"al Discretion, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 367 (2009) 
(reviewing many aspects ofprosecutorial discretion). 
34. See Sara Sun Beale, Introduction to Symposium, supra note 33, at 367. The Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. 
amend VI. 
35. Felony Sentences in State CoUJts, 2004, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, Washington, D.C.), July 2007, at I; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2001, at 2 (2003) ("The proportion of 
convicted defendants who pleaded guilty increased from 87% during 1990 to 95% during 
2001."); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF 
CONVICTED FELONS, 2000, tbl.4.2 (2003), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sc0001st.pdf 
(finding 95% of felony convictions in state courts were achieved through guilty pleas); BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs-
2002, at 455 tb1.5.57 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastor eds., 30th ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/sb2002/sb2002.zip (detailing the system in seventy-five 
counties). Americans are quite familiar with the plea bargaining process, which has been used by 
numerous high profile defendants such as: 
Actor Mel Gibson-driving under the influence; three years' probation and ordered to attend 
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings for a year. 
Musician Richie Sambora-two counts ofDUl; three years' probation and must attend first-
offender alcohol awareness class for three months. 
Singer Boy George-false reporting of an incident and drug charge; agreed to enter a drug 
rehabilitation program and perform community service. 
Football player Michael Vick---dog fighting conspiracy; twenty-three months in prison. 
Football player Plaxico Burress-possession of a weapon; two year prison sentence. 
Financier Bernard Madoff-multiple counts of unlawful stock trading; 150 years in prison. 
Rapper T.I. (Clifford Joseph Harris, Sr.)---attempting to buy unregistered weapons; a year 
and a day imprisonment and $100,000 in fmes. 
Football player Donte Stallworth-manslaughter (killing pedestrian while driving under the 
influence); thirty day jail sentence. 
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require the strictest attention and the verdict of a jury for maximum 
penalties.36 Criminal defendants also derive an obvious benefit. In 
exchange for pleading guilty, the defendant avoids a trial and can receive 
sentence-related concessions from the prosecutor or the dismissal of 
some of the charges in the indictment. Finally, judges benefit by having 
the docket relieved of matters that would otherwise require the resources 
of the court. Plea bargains allow the judiciary to administer justice more 
diligently and efficiently by reducing the caseload of the courts and 
allowing judges more time to attend to fewer·cases. Quick disposition of 
cases through pleas reduces the expense of providing jury trials. 
The arguments in the opposing camp illustrate the potential dangers 
presented by plea bargaining. Critics assert that bargaining facilitates 
numerous subversions of the criminal justice system. For some, it is 
unconscionable that "criminals benefit from bargaining with the state 
and avoid what may be [the more] appropriate," and more harsh, 
sanctions for their crimes.37 For example, a defendant who clearly 
committed an assault with a deadly weapon may negotiate with a 
prosecutor, agreeing to plead guilty to simple assault (with no mention of 
a deadly weapon), in exchange for forgoing a trial on the more severe 
crime. The criminal may well deserve a stem punishment for the crime 
of which he is truly guilty, but because of plea bargaining he will receive 
a lesser punishment for a lesser crime. 38 
Other critics view the concerns from a very different perspective. 
They fear that constitutionally guaranteed safeguards against government 
oppression are circumvented. "[T]he Constitution and the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of it provide ... explicit rules for the determination 
of guilt and the establishment of punishment."39 Plea bargaining eludes 
these stringent due process requirements and the proof required for 
36. Of course, prosecutors may also engage in bargaining for other reasons: "to hedge 
against the risk of acquittal; to preserve scarce resources; to protect victims; and to show 
sympathy for the defendant." John Gleeson, The Sentencing Commission and Prosecutorial 
Discretion: The Role of the Courts in Policing Sentence Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 639, 641-
42 (2008). 
37. See, e.g., Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should ~ Really "Ban" Plea 
Bargaining?: The Core Concems of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 770 (1998). 
38. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 241(a) (Deering 2008) (requiring a punishment of a 
fme not to exceed $1000 and/or imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed six months for 
assault) with 1d § 245(a) (requiring a punishment of two to four years imprisonment in state 
prison or not exceeding one year in county jail and/or a fme not to exceed $10,000 for assault 
with a deadly weapon). 
39. Guidorizzi, supra note 37, at 768. Professor Stuntz notes that there are various 
constitutionally-guaranteed trial rights that only apply to defendants who go to trial; .guilty pleas 
eliminate those rights, leaving states "free to use even extortionate threats to induce pleas." 
William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARv. L. REv. 1969, 20 18 (2008). 
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conviction that occurs during trials.40 The other, and arguably more 
troubling, issue is the potential for innocent defendants to plead guilty. 
The fear of the potential maximum sentence a judge or a jury can impose 
as a result of a guilty trial verdict may cause even the innocent defendant 
to partake in an unfortunate risk assessment. Here, the defendant is 
faced with a choice where the cost of pleading guilty is far outweighed 
by the fear of going to trial. A risk-averse, yet innocent, defendant who is 
well-advised by counsel might choose a lesser sentence attendant to a 
guilty plea, rather than go to trial and face a maximum penalty.41 
Plea bargaining supporters, especially prosecutors, have pushed 
hard in support of the process; opponents have clearly lost the argument 
in the United States Supreme Court, as seen in the pivotal case of 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes.42 In that case, a Kentucky state grand jury 
indicted Hayes on a charge of ''uttering a forged instrument in the 
amount of $88.30.'>43 The offense was punishable by two to ten years in 
prison.44 Hayes's lawyer and the Commonwealth's attorney engaged in 
plea negotiations, during which the prosecutor offered to recommend a 
term of five years imprisonment if Hayes pled guilty.45 However, the 
prosecutor threatened that if Hayes did not plead guilty, he would charge 
Hayes under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, which would subject 
Hayes to a mandatory life sentence based on his two prior felony 
convictions.46 Hayes rejected the plea bargain, was charged as threatened, 
and eventually lost at trial.47 He was sentenced to life in prison pursuant 
to the Act.48 
40. Guidorizzi, supra note 37, at 768. 
41. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARv. L. 
REv. 780, 841 (2006); see also Andrew Taslitz, The Gw:tty Plea State, CRIM. JusT., Fall 2008, at 4, 
4. The Innocence Project reports that about 25% of the 220 prisoners who have been exonerated 
by DNA evidence were convicted with some sort of false confession, incriminating statement, or 
by pleading guilty. See Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: False Confessions, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2010). It 
has identified common reasons for such actions including diminished capacity, mental 
impairment, ignorance of the law, fear of violence, and the threat of a harsh sentence. Id It is 
also common for innocent defendants who have falsely confessed to police to agree to a plea 
bargain out of belief that the false confession will ensure a guilty verdict at trial. See id 
42. 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
43. Id at 358. 
44. ld 
45. Jd 
46. At the postindictment/pretrial meeting, the prosecutor said directly "that if Hayes did 
not plead guilty and 'save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial,' he would return to 
the grand jury to seek an indictment under" the recidivist statute. Id at 358-59. 
47. /dat359. 
48. Id 
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The Supreme Court faced a dilemma. The Justices had indicated in 
a line of cases that a person cannot be punished for exercising 
constitutionally protected rights.49 Hayes had a constitutional right to a 
trial by jury, and it appeared that the prosecutor had penalized him for 
exercising that right. In another line of Supreme Court cases, however, 
the Court had strongly endorsed the guilty plea process as an important 
component of the United States' criminal justice system. The Court, 
therefore, had to decide the constitutionality of a very common practice 
in plea bargaining: the state prosecutor's threat to indict a defendant on a 
more severe charge if the defendant chooses to exercise the right to a trial 
by jury instead of pleading guilty.50 
Defending guilty pleas and plea bargaining, the Court highlighted 
some points that it had previously addressed regarding the process: "the 
importance of counsel during plea negotiations;'51 "the need for a public 
record indicating that a plea was knowingly and voluntarily made,"52 and 
''the requirement that a prosecutor's plea-bargaining promise must be 
kept."53 However, the Justices were able to distinguish the actions of 
Hayes's prosecutor from the "vindictive" measures admonished in earlier 
decisions.54 According to the Court, plea bargaining is a fair practice 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (holding the federal 
kidnapping statute that only allowed juries to recommend the death penalty was violative of due 
process by discouraging the defendant's exercise of the Fifth Amendment right to plead not guilty 
and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); Griffm v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) 
(disallowing comment by judge or prosecutor on the exercise of the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination because to do so would constitute a penalty for exercise of that right). 
50. The Court's exact constitutional question was "whether the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea 
negotiations to reindict the accused on more serious charges if he does not plead guilty to the 
offense with which he was originally charged." Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358. 
51. Id at 362 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,758 (1970)). 
52. Id (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242 (1969)). 
53. Id (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971)). 
54. See id at 362-65. The Court held that vindictiveness must play no part in sentencing 
a defendant in a new trial after he has successfully attacked his first conviction, and that a 
prosecutor must not reindict a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge after the defendant 
invoked an appellate remedy, since in that instance there is a "realistic likelihood of 
'vindictiveness."' Id at 362 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974)). These earlier 
cases "deal[ t] with the State's unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen 
to exercise a legal right to attack his original conviction." Id The practice of plea bargaining, in 
contrast, is an ongoing negotiation process in which the prosecution and the defendant '"arguably 
possess relatively equal bargaining power."' Id (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 
809 (1970). The unconstitutionality of vindictiveness, therefore, lay in the fact that there is a 
danger, "not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from exercising a legal right, ... 
but . . . that the State might . . . retaliat[ e] against the accused for lawfully attacking his 
conviction." Id at 363 (citations omitted). It is a violation of a defendant's due process rights to 
punish him simply "because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do." Id ("[I]n the 
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because there is a mutuality of advantage to both prosecutors and 
defendants. The Court responded to the notion that prosecutors act 
vindictively by threatening to bring more severe charges if a defendant 
does not forgo her right to a trial. Confronting a defendant with such a 
situation is simply "[']an inevitable'-and permissible-' attribute of any 
legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of 
pleas."'55 Because the American justice system has decided to allow-
and even encourage-the negotiation of pleas, "[i]t follows that [the 
Supreme] Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate 
the ... reality that the prosecutor's interest [in plea bargaining] is to 
persuade the defendant to forgo [the] right to plead not guilty."56 
Bordenkircher sent a striking message to prosecutors and defense 
attorneys: the government lawyers have extremely broad discretion; they 
can charge (and threaten) virtually anything and everything necessary to 
get the deal done. The defendants, however, are given a different script: 
take the offer or else.57 The Court decided that threats of an enhanced 
charge and graver punishment used by prosecutors to assure a guilty plea 
were in the State's best interest and were not inherently unfair.58 This is 
the result of the fact that in order to charge a defendant with a crime, a 
prosecutor is only required to have probable cause to believe that an 
accused has committed that crime. Harshness and ugly threats will not 
constitutionally limit the prosecutor's discretion in this area. Additionally, 
this discretion became even more stark with the mandatory sentencing 
and guidelines jurisprudence discussed below. 59 As a consequence, grave 
'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long 
as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer."). 
55. Id at364(quotingChatrm v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,31 (1973)). 
56. ld 
57. "The incentive to plead applies to innocent and guilty defendants alike .... [I]t may 
apply more strongly to innocents, who are more risk averse than their guilty counterparts." 
Stuntz, supra note 41, at 841. 
58. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365. The Court addressed prosecutorial vindictive-
ness later in United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982). Once again, the prosecutor's broad 
discretion was accepted, since there is no presumption of vindictiveness in the usual pretrial 
negotiation context. Id at 381. In the course of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may 
uncover additional information that suggests a basis for further prosecution, or he simply may 
come to realize that information possessed by the State has a broader significance. Id At this 
stage of proceedings, the prosecutor's assessment of the proper extent of prosecution "may not 
have crystallized." Id See generally Michael M. O'Hear, The End o!Bordenkircher: Extending 
the Logic of Apprendi to Plea Bargaining, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 835 (2006). 
59. See inffa Part IV Commentators have strenuously debated the impact of varying 
sentencing regimes on the prosecutors' bargaining power and ultimate discretion. See, e.g., 
O'Hear, supra note 58; Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REv. 775 (2002); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal 
Laws Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2548, 2558 (2004); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and 
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concerns exist as to whether American prosecutors are able to circumvent 
entrenched constitutional rights in the pretrial context during plea 
bargaining. 60 U.S. prosecutors appear to have a stranglehold on 
defendants and their lawyers, primarily because the prosecutor has the 
broad power to define the scope of charges brought against the defendant. 
This power is readily accepted and approved of because of the sense that 
in plea bargaining there is a "give-and-take" negotiations process, in 
which the prosecution and defense have arguably equal bargaining 
power.61 
B. Australia 
Australian prosecutors, like their U.S. counterparts, are the 
gatekeepers to the criminal justice system, determining which criminal 
charges will be prosecuted and how they will be prosecuted. In both 
jurisdictions, their role is pivotal to the integrity and efficacy of the 
criminal justice system.62 However, there are also significant differences 
between both the responsibilities of and constraints governing the 
practices of Australian and American prosecutors. · 
In Australia, there are two categories of prosecutors. Serious crimes 
heard by superior courts are prosecuted by legal practitioners employed 
by statutory Directors of Public Prosecution (DPP), which operate in 
Plea Bargaining: Mats Discovery Got To Do with It?, CRIM. JusT., Fall 2008, at 28. One astute 
commentator succinctly captured this idea: "No government official has as much unreviewable 
power or discretion as the prosecutor. Few regulations bind or even guide prosecutorial 
discretion, and fewer still work well." Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation ~mus 
Prosecutorial Accountability, !57 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 959 (2009). 
60. See Stuntz, supra note 41, at 791. 
61. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362. As stated by the former Chief Justice in Santobello v. 
New JVrk, 404 U.S. 257,260-61 (1971): 
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the 
accused, sometimes loosely called "plea bargaining;• is an essential component of the 
administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged .... 
Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process 
but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final 
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced 
idleness during pretrial confmement for those who are denied release pending trial; it 
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal 
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and 
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when 
they are ultimately imprisoned. 
62. John McKechnie, Directom of Public Prosecutions: Independent and Accountable, 26 
U. W. AUSTL. L. REv. 268, 271-72 (1996); Ivan L Potas, Measuring Prosecutorial Discretion, in 
PROSECIJTORJAL DISCRETION, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY SEMJNAR PROCEEDINGS 7-
9 NOVEMBER 1984 (Ivan L. Potas ed., 1985). 
2010] AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES 347 
each State and at the Federal level.63 The office of DPP is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, created as a result of difficulties encountered with 
prosecution at less than arm's length from the government.64 At the 
summary level, where the majority of minor crimes such as drunk 
driving, minor assaults, and thefts are tried, prosecutions continue to be 
largely administered by police officers with specialist training in law and 
advocacy. 65 To the American eye, and in the view of some senior 
prosecutors in Australia,66 deploying nonlawyers-who are not subject to 
the ethical constraints that govern those admitted to the bar, are unable to 
claim privilege over their communications, and are not fully trained in 
the law to prosecute the majority of criminal cases-may seem like a 
false economy, especially given instances of corruption that come to light 
from time to time. 67 However, there is scant evidence that police 
prosecutors are generally corrupt, inefficient, or incompetent.68 Conse-
quently, it seems that the administrative inertia and financial resourcing 
required to overcome the status quo remain substantial barriers in most 
Australian jurisdictions to the wholesale transfer of all prosecutions to 
the DPP. 
63. See Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1983 (Austl.); Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act, 1986 (N.S.W:); Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1991 (N. Terr.); Director of 
Public Prosecutions Act, 1984 (Queens!.); Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1991 (S. Austl.); 
Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1973 (Tas.); Public Prosecutions Act, 1994 (Viet.); Director 
ofPublic Prosecutions Act, 1991 (W Austl.). 
64. Richard Refshauge, Prosecutorial Discretion-Australia, in THE CONVERGENCE OF 
LEGALSYSTEMSINTifE21STCENfURY: AN AUSTRALIAN APPROACH 358-59 (Gabriel A. Moens & 
Rodolphe Biffot eds., 2002). 
65. JILL HUNTER ET AL., LmGATION VOLUME 11: EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL PROCESS 716 
(7th ed. 2005). However, the Commonwealth and the Australian Capital Territory are exceptions. 
All summary prosecutions in these jurisdictions are undertaken by statutory Directors of Public 
Prosecution. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, Steps in the Commonwealth Prosecution 
Process, http://www.cdpp.gov.au!Practice/ProsecutionProcess.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2010); 
Australian Capital Territory, Director of Public Prosecutions, http://dpp.act.gov.au (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2010). 
66. MiCHAEL ROZENES, PROSECUIDRIAL DISCRETION IN AUSTRALIA TODAY 4 (2004), 
http://www.aic.gov/au/events/aic%20upcorning<>/o20events/1996/-media/conferences/prosecuting/ 
rozenes.ashx; Chris Corns, Police Summary Prosecutions: The Past, Present and Future, Paper 
Presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology Conference on the History of Crime, Policing 
and Punishment (Dec. 9-10, 1999), in POLICING TifE LUCKY COUNTRY (Mike Enders & Benoit 
Dupont eds., 2001), unedited version available athttp://www.aic.gov.au/events/aic%20upcoming 
%20events/1999/hcpp.aspx (quoting from a number of state DPPs in favor of transferring 
summary prosecutions from the police to the DPP). 
67. See, e.g., N.S.W: INDEP. CoMM'N AGAINST CORRUPTION, INVESTIGATION INTO TifE 
RELATIONSHIP BE1WEEN POLICE AND CRIMINALS, SECOND REPORT 54-55 ( 1994 ). 
68. Ken Drew, The New South Wales Police Prosecutor, in IMPROVING ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE: THE FUTURE OF PARALEGAL PROFESSIONALS 103 (Julia Vernon & Francis Regan eds., 
1992). 
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To promote the dispassionate exercise of prosecutorial power and 
discretion, prosecutors (whether police prosecutors or DPP officers) 
generally do not participate in the criminal investigation process or in 
decisions to charge suspects.69 These are areas reserved for police and 
other criminal investigation units. At least insofar as serious crimes are 
concerned, institutional separation of the DPP from the government, and 
thus from direct accountability to the community, is designed to 
depoliticize the office and ensure that prosecutions are carried out 
lawfully and fairly and are not unduly influenced by media-manipulated 
community campaigns. 70 
However, Australian de-politicization has a downside, compounded 
by limited judicial review of prosecutorial discretion 71 and almost 
nonexistent parliamentary oversight. 72 Lack of transparency and 
accountability has led to complaints that Australian prosecutors are 
secretive, remote from victims of crime and the community generally, 
and that they poorly document their dealings and decision making.73 
69. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 717; see ROZENES, supra note 66, at 3. Nonetheless, 
there is substantial precharge consultation between the prosecution service and investigators. 
Damian Bugg, Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, Speech at the 2007 Rule of Law 
Conference: The Independence of the Prosecutor and the Rule of Law 20-21 (Aug. 31-Sept. 1, 
2007), http://www.lawcouncil.asn.aullibrary/speeches/speeches-rule-of-law.cfin. 
70. HUNTERET AL., supra note 65, at 718; see Refshauge, supra note 64, at 358; see also 
Price v. Ferris (1994) 74 A. Crirn. R. 127, 130 (per Kirby P.) ("What is the object of having a 
Director of Public Prosecutions? Obviously, it is to ensure that a high degree of independence in 
the vital task of making prosecution decisions and exercising prosecution discretions. Its purpose 
is illustrated in the present case. The Court was informed that, in the prosecution of a police 
officer, it is now normal practice in this State for the prosecution to be 'taken over' from a private 
prosecutor or informant and conducted by the DPP. The purpose of so acting is to ensure that 
there is manifest independence in the conduct of the prosecution. It is to avoid the suspicion that 
important prosecutorial discretions will be exercised otherwise than on neutral grounds. It is to 
avoid the suspicion, and to answer the occasional allegation, that the prosecution may not be 
conducted with appropriate vigour. Analyses by law reform and other bodies have demonstrated 
conclusively how vital are the decisions made by prosecutors."). 
71. Judicial review of prosecutorial discretion is limited to rare cases where an abuse of 
process can be established. See Maxwell v. The Queen (1996) 184 C.L.R. 501, 513-14. 
Otherwise, "[ d]ecisions to commence, not to commence[,] or to terminate a prosecution are made 
independently of the courts." Pnce 74 A. Crirn. R. at 130. The High Court has stated in The 
King v. Weaver(l931) 45 C.L.R. 321, 334: "It is entirely a matter for the law officers of the 
Crown to determine the form of prosecution, and for the Court to determine whether the charge 
made had been supported." 
72. Refshauge, supra note 64, at 357 n.39. 
73. Robyn Holder & Nicole Mayo, U1Jat Do Women Want? Prosecuting Family Violence 
in the ACT, 15 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 5, 12 (2003); ROZENES, supra note 66, at 2; 
Refshauge, supra note 64, at 354. In South Australia, following a particularly controversial plea 
bargain, the Solicitor-General, Chris Kourakis QC, recommended: "More prescriptive 
requirements as to consultations with victims and police and recording and reporting of 
negotiations should be adopted." Press Release, House of Assembly, Plea Bargain Reforms 
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Charge bargaining, the Australian term for plea bargaining, is a specific 
target of such criticism. 74 Like the United States, charge bargaining is 
well entrenched in Australian criminal practice with studies reporting 
that defense counsel engage in charge bargaining in at least 50% of their 
cases.
75 However, to many Australians, charge bargaining is redolent of 
backroom deals between overly cozy prosecution and defense lawyers 
seeking to minimize the time, effort, and resources required to prosecute 
cases properly and ensure that sentencing principles and the rule of law 
are observed. 76 There is a strong community view that, unchecked, 
charge bargaining trivializes victims, leads to overly lenient sentencing of 
the guilty, and unjustly punishes those who, in good faith, seek a trial of 
the charges against them. 77 
Nationally uniform guidelines comprise the primary mechanism for 
regulating the use of prosecutorial discretion, including discretion over 
charge bargaining.78 Although the guidelines are not directly enforceable, 
their breach may assist in establishing an abuse of process 79 or a 
Recommended by Kourakis Report (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://netk.net.au/Parliament/ 
Medial.asp. 
74. Refshauge, ·supra note 64, at 381; Robert D. Seifinan & Arie Freiberg, Plea 
B8IlJaining in Victoria: The Role of Counsel, 25 CRIM. L.J. 64, 64 (2001 ). 
75. Seifinan & Freiberg, supra note 74, at 68. An earlier study by Kathy Mack and 
Sharon R. Anleu, found charge bargaining occurred "nearly every day" at the defense bar. KATHY 
MACK & SHARON R. ANLEU, PLEADING GUILTY: ISSUES AND PRACTICES 20 (1995). 
76. NSW Revamps Sentencing Guidelines, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www. 
theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197 ,23032363-5006784,00.htrnl; ACT VICTIMS OF CRIME 
COORDINATOR, THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE: OPERATION OF THE VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT 1994 IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 1996-2007, at 79 (2008), available at http://www. victirnsupport. 
act.gov.au/res/File/Quality"/o20of'lo20Justice%20June%202008.pdf; GORDON SAMUELS, REVIEW 
OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES DIRECTOR OF PuBLIC PROSECUTIONS' POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR 
CHARGE BARGAINING AND TENDERING OF AGREED FACTS § 6.1 (2002), http://www.lawlink.nsw. 
gov.au/report/lpd_reports.nsf/pages/report__gsamuels. 
77. Rowena Johns, Victims of Crime: Plea Bargains, Compensation, Victim Impact 
Statements and Support Services 52-53 (N.S.W Parliamentary Library Research Serv., Briefmg 
Paper No. 10/02, 2002), http://www.parliament.nsf.gov/au/prodlparlment/pub1ications.nsf/0/578 
C6F10C6D98565CA256ECF00083B4D/$File/10-02.pdf. Nonetheless, a defendant who chooses 
to proceed to trial, while not entitled to the mitigation in sentence afforded a plea of guilty, should 
not be punished for the way in which the defense was carried out. See Cameron v. The Queen 
(2002) 209 C.L.R. 339, 351; Siganto v. The Queen (1998) 194 C.L.R. 656,666. 
78. See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH DIR. OF PuB. PROSECUTIONS, PROSECUTION POLICY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH 3 (2008), available at http://www.cdpp.gov.au!Publications/ProsecutionPolicy/ 
ProsecutionPolicy.pdf; TAS. DIR. OF PuB. PROSECUTIONS, PROSECUTION GUIDELINES, available at 
http://www.crownlaw.tas.gov.au/dpp/prosecution__guidelines (last visited Jan. 10, 201 0); S. AUSTL. 
DIR. OF PuB. PROSECUTIONS, PROSECUTION POLICY & GUIDELINES, available at http://www.dpp. 
sa.gov.au/03/prosecution__po1icy _quidelines.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 201 0); N.S.W OFFICE OF THE 
DIR. OF PuB. PROSECUTIONS, PROSECUTION GUIDELINES 1 (2007), available at http://www.odpp. 
nsw.gov.au/guidelines/guidelines.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). 
79. See MG v. R (2007) N.S.W Crim. Ct. App. 57, para. 59. 
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miscarriage of justice on appeal.80 In that way they offer defendants 
some protection against improper inducements and coercion that may 
arise in plea negotiations. In relation to charge bargaining, the guidelines 
are primarily directed toward negotiations that revolve around the 
exchange of guilty pleas to some offences and the withdrawal from 
prosecution of others. The adequacy and admissibility of the evidence 
and the reasonable prospects of conviction comprise a priori 
considerations. Once it has been determined that sufficient evidence 
exists to warrant particular charges, the prosecutor is also bound to 
consider the public interest. Even though sufficient evidence of guilt is 
available, it may not be in the public interest to prosecute. The public 
interest encompasses factors such as the seriousness of the offense, the 
prior criminal history and personal circumstances of the defendant, the 
prevalence of the offence and the need for deterrence, the attitude of the 
alleged victim, and community attitudes toward the offence. In respect to 
the choice of charges and charge bargaining, prosecutors are directed to 
choose charges that adequately reflect the nature and extent of the 
offence so that they provide the basis for an appropriate sentence. Under 
no circumstances are charges to be laid for the purpose of subsequently 
engaging in charge bargaining. Further, prosecutors are directed not to 
entertain a charge bargaining proposal if the defendant maintains his or 
her innocence. For reasons that will be explained below, the guidelines 
only give cursory attention to negotiations regarding severity of sentence. 
Nor is there any guidance regarding negotiations over the factual basis 
upon which the offence is evaluated. Bargaining in relation to the 
existence of mitigating circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
offence or matters related to the defendant is therefore regulated by 
general ethical principles governing the conduct ofprosecutors.81 
Reviews demonstrate that charge bargaining is not counterpro-
ductive to proper sentencing practice.82 Still, in one state, New South 
Wales, public disquiet and political pressure regarding perceived 
inappropriate charge bargaining outcomes have been so fierce that 
80. See Livermore v. R (2006) N.S.W Crim. Ct. App. 334, para. 2. 
81. See genemlly Seifman & Freiberg, supra note 74, regarding a survey of pmctice 
among the Victorian Bar which found that negotiations regarding the severity of sentence and a 
favomble summary of the factual basis of guilt were the second and third most popular form of 
charge bargaining. Jd at 70-71. In fact, negotiations over the factual basis of guilt scored the 
highest mean percentage involvement mte among Victorian barristers in charge bargaining. Jd at 
70. 
82. See, e.g., Denise Lievore, Prosecutona.J Discretion in Adult Sexual Assault Cases, 
TRENDs & ISSUES IN CRIME & CRIM. JUST. (Austl. Inst. of Criminology, Canberm, Austl.), Jan. 
2005, at 1, 1; SAMUELS, supra note 76. 
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Parliament has adopted a trial measure mandating compulsory 
conferencing between defense and prosecution counsel and obligatory 
sentencing discounts for guilty pleas.83 The Criminal Case Conferencing 
Trial Act, 2008, provides that if an offender pleads guilty to an offence 
prior to being committed for sentence, the court must allow a discount of 
25% on the term of imprisonment or fine that would otherwise be 
imposed.84 If the offender pleads not guilty and at any time after being 
committed for trial decides to enter a guilty plea, the court may provide 
the offender with a sentencing discount of 12.5%, which can be 
increased if the court is satisfied that substantial grounds for doing so 
have been established.85 As it was enacted as a pilot measure, the Act 
only operated between May 1, 2008 and May 1, 2009.86 The Act was 
introduced chiefly to reduce the last minute resolution of serious criminal 
matters and to improve the effective deployment of judicial and 
prosecution resources in criminal trials, but it also has had the collateral 
effect of more strictly regulating the conduct of plea bargaining and of 
limiting the discretion of the trial judge as to sentencing. 87 
A number of other Australian jurisdictions adopted informal 
sentencing indication guidelines, which outline likely discounts in 
sentencing should a guilty plea be proffered. 88 These sentencing 
guidelines overcome the Australian reluctance to involve the sentencing 
judge in the plea bargain process,89 and thus constitute another point of 
83. See Criminal Case Conferencing Trial Act, 2008, § 17(1) (N.S.W:). 
84. Prior to the enactment of this legislation, R v. Thomson (2000) 115 N.S.W: Crim. Ct. 
App. 104, 139, stated that a plea of guilty could attract a 35% discount on sentence. 
85. Criminal Case Conferencing Trial Act, 2008, § 17(2) (N.S.W:). 
86. Id § 5. 
87. See Dennis Miralis, Tougher Sentences for NSW 0/knders Pleading Guilty, 46 LAW 
Soc'v J.,Aug. 2008, at 69,70-71. 
88. Arie Freiberg & John Willis, Sentence Indication, 27 CRIM. L.J. 246, 249 (2003). 
89. See the following from R v. Mafl.wo(1989) S.A. St. R. 503,509-10: 
The prosecution has a role in the sentencing process which consists of presenting the 
facts to the Court and of making any submissions which it thinks proper on the 
question of what sentence ought to be imposed. The decision as to what sentence is to 
be imposed is, however, entirely a matter for the Court which may, of course, be 
influenced by the arguments that are placed before it by the prosecution as well as by 
the defence, but must never be influenced by the attitudes or opinions as distinct from 
the arguments of either. In particular it must be stressed that the attitude of the 
prosecution towards a particular proposed course of action in relation to sentence is, as 
such, irrelevant; the view of the prosecution has no greater weight than the arguments 
advanced in support of that view. These propositions are elementary and fundamental 
propositions relating to the administration of criminal justice by independent courts, 
but their express elaboration may assist in clarifYing the confusion of thought which lay 
at the root of some of the argument addressed on the present appeal. 
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difference between the two jurisdictions. In Australia, if a plea of guilty 
is proffered, discussion between the prosecution and the trial judge as to 
the appropriate discount in sentencing that a defendant should receive 
would be regarded as highly improper.90 Negotiation outside of the 
courtroom is confined to defense and prosecution counsel. Typically, as 
the prosecution guidelines referred to earlier indicate, defense counsel 
may propose that a guilty plea91 will be accepted by the defendant on the 
basis that the prosecution will not oppose a submission to the sentencing 
judge that the penalty for the offence ought to fall within a nominated 
range. Under the guidelines prosecutors may only agree to such requests 
where the nominated range is consistent with an acceptable exercise of 
the court's sentencing discretion. However, any agreement between the 
prosecution and defense counsel of this nature will not bind the 
sentencing judge and will only operate as a submission before the court.92 
Notwithstanding earlier criticism from some members of the judiciary 
who are wary of applying both a simplistic mathematical discount for a 
guilty plea upon an otherwise determined sentence,93 and also concerned 
by the potential discriminatory effect against persons who exercise their 
right to a trial,94 the sentencing guidelines that permit an identified 
See also Malvaso v. The Queen (1989) 168 C.L.R. 227, 233; GAS v. The Queen (2004) 217 
C.L.R. 198, 210. 
90. SeeR v. Pugh (2005) 158 A. Crim. R. 302, 339-44; R v. Marshall (1981) V.R. 725, 
733-34; The Queen v. Tait (1979) 46 F.L.R. 386,387-88. In each of these cases sentencing judges 
were directed that any submissions regarding agreement between prosecution and defense 
counsel with respect to sentence should be made in open court in the presence of both counsel 
and the defendant. 
91. A study by Seifinan and Freiberg demonstrated that plea bargaining was usually 
initiated by defense counsel and on some occasions at summary level as suggested by the 
presiding magistrate. Seifman & Freiberg, supra note 74, at 69. This situation, of course, is very 
much unlike that seen in the U.S. where prosecutors routinely initiate the process. 
92. See LJW v. Western Australia (2007) W.A.S.C.A. 68, para. 46; Ahmad v. Regina 
(2006) N.S.W. Crim. Ct. App. 117, para. 21 (citing GAS v. The Queen (2004) 217 C.L.R. 198, 
21 0-11 ). In Ahmad v. Regina, the sentencing judge refused to accept a 25% discount for a plea of 
guilty agreed to by the prosecution and defense counsel. [2006] N.S.W.C.C.A. 117 paras. 6, 9. 
Instead, the sentencing judge applied a sentencing discount of 15%. Id para. 10. The New South 
Wales Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's determination noting: 
The agreement can neither bind the judge nor be given any greater weight than is 
appropriate to a submission of counsel with knowledge of the facts relevant to the 
offence and the offender. It must of course be carefully considered but carries no 
greater weight than any other submission which the Crown may make in the sentencing 
process. If it were otherwise the fundamental assumption that it is for the judge to 
determine an appropriate sentence would be seriously compromised. 
Id para. 23. 
93. See, e.g., Wong v. The Queen (2001) 207 C.L.R. 584,611-12. 
94. See, e.g., Cameron v. The Queen (2002) 209 C.L.R. 339, 343. 
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discount in sentencing for a plea of guilty have been subsequently 
approved by the Australian High Court.95 
As in the United States, Australian charge bargaining performs an 
important utilitarian function in the criminal justice system by avoiding 
costly and unnecessary trials, saving the victims of offending the distress 
associated with attending and testifying in court, and assuring that 
criminality is punished in a timely manner. However, rather than 
focusing upon the potentially coercive nature of charge bargaining and 
concomitant sentence indication schemes, as practiced in the United 
States, the Australian community appears to be more concerned by the 
notion that charge bargaining leads to "horse trading" between the 
prosecution and the defense and results in the "sale" of justice. There is 
substantial concern that offenders are not receiving their 'just desserts." 
That community concern is exacerbated by the general lack of 
transparency and accountability over prosecutorial discretion collateral to 
the creation of a strong and independent prosecution service. The 
tension between a strong and independent prosecution service and 
responsiveness to community concern over criminal behavior is but a 
microcosm of a larger law and order debate reflected more generally in 
sentencing, which is discussed later in this Article. 
Ill. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Double jeopardy is one area where the two systems of criminal 
justice are substantially at odds. The Americans remain firm in their 
commitment to the guarantees established centuries ago. There is 
considerable movement away from that commitment by the Australians, 
as there is by the English. 
A. Australia 
There is no constitutional basis for the doctrine of double jeopardy 
in Australia. After a comparative analysis of Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence in the United States, just two years ago the New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that the principle of finality 
of verdict lay outside of Australian constitutional protection.96 Rather, the 
95. Markarian v. The Queen (2005) 228 C.L.R. 357, 375. 
96. R v. JS (2007) 230 F.L.R. 275, 306-09 (Mason, P., concurring). The argument 
proffered by the defendant in this case was that Crown appeals against acquittal were 
constitutionally prohibited by the Constitution of Australia Act, section 80. Id at 294 
(Spigelrnan, CJ, lead opinion). Section 80 guarantees trial by jury for indictable federal offences. 
Id The defendant argued that the principle of trial by jury incorporated the finality of jury 
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Court found that double jeopardy was a creature of the common law and 
therefore subject to statutory limitation or negation.97 Indeed, despite 
article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,98 
the double jeopardy principle has been qualified-allowing retrials for 
acquittals in the face of fresh and compelling evidence-by the following 
state enactments: Crimes (Appeal & Review) Amendment (Double 
Jeopardy) Act, 2006 (N.S.W); Criminal Code (Double Jeopardy) 
Amendment Act, 2007 (Queensl.); and Criminal Law Consolidation 
(Double Jeopardy) Amendment Act, 2008 (S. Austl.). There is also a 
recommendation from the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee 
that double jeopardy be reformed at the federallevel. 99 
The Australian law of double jeopardy springs from the older, 
narrower doctrines of autrefois convict/acquit 100 Autrefois convict/acquit 
are defenses to a criminal charge both at common law and under statute. 
Thus the Queensland Criminal Code provides: 
It is a defence to a charge of any offence to show that the accused person 
has already been tried, and convicted or acquitted upon an indictment on 
which the person might have been convicted of the offence with which the 
person is charged, or has already been acquitted upon indictment, or has 
already been convicted, of an offence of which the person might be 
convicted upon the indictment or complaint on which the person is 
h d !01 c arge . 
While each doctrine aims to prevent inconsistent verdicts and to preserve 
finality, they are slightly different in purpose. Autrefois convict has been 
characterized as similar to merger in res judicata, and is intended to 
preclude double punishment, whereas autrefois acquit is characterized as 
verdicts. Id This was rejected and the validity of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, 2001, 
section I 07 (N.S.W:) was upheld. Id at 305. 
97. Id at 303. 
98. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) entered into force 
in Australia on November 13, 1980. 1980 Austl. T.S. No. 23. However, international treaties like 
the ICCPR are not self-executing in Australia, and therefore remain nonbinding in domestic law 
unless implemented by statute. Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292,305. 
99. MODEL CRIMINAL CODE OFFICERS COMM. (MCCOC), AUSTL. AIToRNEY GENERAL'S 
DEP'T, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (2004), http://www.ag.gov.au/www.agd/wpattach.nsf!VAP/CCFD7369 
FCAE9B8F32F341 DBE09780 1 FF)-Double+ Jeopardy+ Report+ 25+Mar.pdf/$file/Double+ Jeopa 
rdy+Report+ 25+Mar.pdf. 
100. See Marion S. Kirk, "Jeopardy" During the Pedod of the ~ar Books, 82 U. PA. L. 
REv. 602, 602 (1934); Jill Hunter, The Development of the Rule Against Double Jeopardy, 5 J. 
LEGAL HIST. I, 4 (1984). 
101. Criminal Code Act, 1899, § 17 (Queens!.). Analogous statutory provisions from other 
states include: Criminal Procedure Act, 2004, § 126(3) (W: Austl.); Criminal Code Act, 1924, 
§ II (Tas.); Criminal Code Act, 2009, §§ 18-20 (N. Terr.); Criminal Procedure Act, 1986, § 156 
(N.S.W:); Crimes Act, 1958, § 394 (Viet.); Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935, § 285 (S. 
Austl.); Crimes Act, 1900, § 283 (Austl. Cap. Terr.). 
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a "species of estoppel" designed to prevent the ordeal of multiple 
prosecutions. 102 In either case, it must be shown that the elements of the 
offence charged are the same or substantially the same as those for which 
the accused was previously convicted or acquitted. 103 This latter 
requirement substantially constricts the scope of each doctrine. Hence in 
R v. I: NJ (No. 2), neither autrefois acquit nor autrefois convict applied 
with respect to the prosecution of the defendant for murder, even though 
the defendant had been previously convicted and sentenced for wounding 
with intent and acquitted of attempted murder in relation to the same 
injuries which eventually led to the victim's death. 104 Nor do the pleas 
apply to a verdict which is unavailable at law such that the defendant is 
not "in jeopardy." Accordingly, in Island Man'time Ltd v. Filipowski, 
autrefois acquit was unavailable where a prosecution was dismissed 
following a "no case to answer" submission arising out of a defective 
summons.
105 
As a result, the double jeopardy principle has been extended beyond 
autrefois acquit! convict and incorporated within the doctrine of abuse of 
process. Abuse of process in Australia is somewhat of a potpourri of 
illustrations of the exercise of inherent power that all superior courts have 
to control the integrity of their own processes. Despite a lack of precise 
definition, it is generally accepted that abuse of process comprises one or 
more of the following elements: (1) invoking of the court's process for 
an illegitimate purpose, 106 for example, initiating a prosecution for the 
purpose of persecuting an innocent defendant rather than securing the 
conviction of the guilty;107 (2) the use of process in a manner that is 
unjustifiably oppressive, for example, unreasonably delaying prosecution 
of the defendant and thereby depriving him or her of the ability to 
adequately defend prosecution; 108 or (3) using the court's process in a 
102. The Queen v. Carroll [2002] H.C.A. 55, para. 30; Pearce v. The Queen (1998) 194 
C.L.R. 610, 626-27; R v. Stone (2005) 157 A. Crim. R. 41, 48. 
103. SeeR v. P, NJ (No. 2) (2007) 99 S.A. St. R. 1, 6; Gilham v. The Queen (2007) 178 A. 
Crim. R. 72, 82; Pearce, 194 C.L.R. at 615-16. 
104. 99 S.A. St. R. at 10, 25 (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused, [2009] 
H.C.A. 6). 
I 05. (2006) 226 C.L.R. 328, 331-32. 
I 06. PNJ v. R. (2009) H.C.A. 6, para. 3; Rogers v. The Queen (1994) 181 C.L.R. 251, 286. 
107. See, e.g., Zollo v. Nat'! Austl. Bank, S.A.S.C. 38, para. 22 (2009); Williams v. Spautz 
(1992) 174 C.L.R. 509,526-27. 
108. See The Queen v. Davis (1995) 57 F.C.R. 512, 520; Jago v. Dist. Court of N.S.W. 
(1989) 168 C.L.R. 23, 30. See also R v. Benbrika (2008) 182 A. Crim. R. 205, 223-24, where the 
court threatened to stay proceedings because the conditions in which the accused were held on 
remand led to impairment of mental function such that the accused were not able to properly 
instruct their legal counsel nor participate in their trial. The stay was granted until the conditions 
of incarceration were ameliorated. Id at 236. 
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manner that brings the administration of justice into disrepute. 109 Where 
abuse of process is appropriately raised, the court has discretion to stay 
criminal proceedings. The exercise of the discretion involves balancing 
the interests of the community with those of the applicant. 
Generally speaking, where evidence is admitted in a subsequent 
trial that is manifestly inconsistent with a prior acquittal, the balancing 
process referred to above will favor the exercise of the discretion to stay 
proceedings, 110 even though technically the plea of autrefois acquit does 
not apply. Thus, in The Queen v. Carroll, the High Court found that a 
petjury indictment was an abuse of process that ought to have been 
stayed by the trial judge because it was based on the premise that the 
defendant had lied in a previous murder trial where he had denied his 
guilt on oath. 111 This was the case even though the plea of autrefois 
acquit could not be established since petjury was not a verdict available 
on his trial for murder and the verdict of murder was not available on his 
trial for petjury. 112 
In G1lham v. The Queen, the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal extended the principle of incontrovertibility to convictions, 
holding that manifest inconsistency between a prior conviction and a new 
criminal prosecution would also attract discretion to stay proceedings.113 
The defendant in Gilham had previously pled guilty to the manslaughter 
of his brother on the basis that he had killed his brother after being 
provoked by the brother's murder of their parents. 114 Following further 
investigation, the defendant was subsequently charged with the murder of 
his parents. 115 Notwithstanding a determination that the manslaughter 
conviction was manifestly inconsistent with a conviction for the murder 
of his parents, the Court held that the prosecution did not amount to an 
abuse of process warranting its intervention. 116 This rested on the basis 
that the defendant was never in jeopardy of being convicted of the 
109. SeeThe Queen v. Carroll [2002] H.C.A. 55, para. 86; Pearce v. The Queen (1998) 194 
C.L.R. 610, 625; see also Rogers, 181 C.L.R. at 268 (fmding that multiple prosecutions for the 
same offence were an abuse of process because they were contrary to the need for judicial 
determinations to be treated as incontrovertibly correct, which would tend to bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute). 
110. Compare Gilham v. The Queen (2007) 178 A. Crim. R. 72, 88 [2002], with Carroll 
[2002] H.C.A. 55, paras. 42, 51. See generally The Queen v. Storey (1978) 140 C.L.R. 364; 
Garrett v. The Queen (1977) 139 C.L.R. 437. 
Ill. [2002] H.C.A. 55, para. 51. 
112. ld 
113. 178 A. Crim. R. at 88. 
114. Id at 75. 
115. Id 
116. Id at 91-92. 
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murder of his parents in the first trial. 117 More importantly, the Court 
determined that the community interest required the defendant to be put 
to trial for the murder of his parents where there was reasonable evidence 
of his guilt. 118 In the Court's view, the scandal of inconsistent verdicts 
was substantially outweighed by the scandal of allowing a potential 
murderer to escape trial. 119 
However, outside of prosecutions involving incontrovertibility, 
analogous to the exercise of the discretion to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence examined in our previous article, it appears fairly unlikely that 
Australian courts will stay proceedings, reserving this remedy for 
exceptional cases. 120 Given the unlikelihood that the discretion to stay 
proceedings will be exercised, it is therefore surprising that the Council 
of Australian Governments (COAG) determined that the principle of 
double jeopardy applicable to acquittals should be reformed. 121 
The COAG recommendation followed reforms instituted in the 
United Kingdom by the Criminal Justice Act, 2003. Still, the impetus for 
reform was home grown rather than imported from the former "mother 
country," stemming from community disquiet and a media campaign 
generated in the aftermath of the High Court's decision in The Queen v. 
Carrolrz2 and the release of the Model Criminal Code Officers 
Committee Discussion Paper. 123 Consequently, the reforms fall into a 
wider "law and order" agenda that perceives the protection of rights as a 
failure to prioritize community security properly and ensure that 
criminality is punished. To that extent, the double jeopardy reforms, 
117. Id 
118. Id at 132. 
119. Id at 122. The Queensland Criminal Code, 1899, excludes conviction of a lesser 
offence from the scope of provisions creating exceptions to the double jeopardy rule. Criminal 
Code Act, 1899, § 678A(2) (Queensl.). 
120. A stay of proceedings is an order that any further criminal prosecutions cease. A stay 
can be permanent or temporary. A permanent stay insulates the defendant from all further 
prosecution and therefore should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. See Island Mar. 
Ltd. v. Filipowski (2006) 226 C.L.R. 328, 341; see also [2006] N.S.W:C.C.A. 392 para. 101; 
Pearce v. The Queen ( 1998) 194 C.L.R. 610, 620 (declining to issue a stay based partly on such 
reasoning). 
121. See Council of Austl. Gov'ts (COAG), Council of Australian Governments' Meeting 
13 April 2007, Double Jeopardy Law Reform, http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/ 
2007-04-13/index_old.cfin. 
122. Kelley Burton, Double Jeopardy: The Queensland Refonn, PR.ocmR, Apr. 2008, at 
21, 21. 
123. Law Council of Austl., Model Criminal Code: Chapter 2: Issue Estoppel, Double 
Jeopardy and Prosecution Appeals Against Acqwtta/s (Law Council of Austl., Discussion Paper, 
Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.aulshadomx/apps/fins/finsdownload.cfin? 
file_uuid=330EOF8D-IE4F-17FA-D2EC-735FE715E653&siteName=lca. 
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which limit what was previously considered an inviolable right,124 relate 
to the commentary upon the Australian official-centric approach to 
criminal procedure outlined in our earlier article. 
Interestingly, both the Australia Capital Territory and Victoria, 
which have adopted Human Rights Charters, reserved their position in 
relation to COAG's determination. COAG's recommendation directly 
conflicts with section 26 of the Victoria Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act and section 24 of the Australia Capital Territory 
Human Rights Act, 2004, both of which mirror article 14(7) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These provisions 
protect the finality of acquittals and convictions as long as they are made 
according to law. 125 
The reform model adopted by COAG recommends that a person 
acquitted of an offence should not be protected by double jeopardy 
where: 
1. Fresh and compelling evidence attained subsequent to the original 
acquittal demonstrates guilt. COAG recommended that this 
exception only apply in relation to the retrial of serious criminal cases 
including murder, manslaughter, trafficking or manufacturing 
commercial quantities of drugs, aggravated rape, arid armed robbery. 
2. The original acquittal is tainted by false evidence or corruption and it 
is more likely than not that but for the false evidence or corruption 
the accused would have been convicted. 
3. The subsequent prosecution is for an offence contrary to the 
administration of justice, for example, bribery of a juror or a witness, 
conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, or perjury.126 
Subject to variations, this is the model adopted in the legislation in New 
South Wales, Queensland, and South Australia, as outlined at the 
commencement of Part III.A. 127 In those states, applications for retrial of 
an acquittal must be made by the Director of Public Prosecutions to the 
Court of Criminal Appeal, Court of Appeal, or the Full Court of the 
Supreme Court respectively, which may order retrial if it considers that in 
124. See Mirko Bagaric & Luke Neal, Double Jeopardy in Australia: The Illusion of an 
Absolute Protection and the Prosecution Process as Punishment, 8 CANBERRA L. REv. 87, 109 
(2005). 
125. King v. Fricker (2007) A.C.T.S.C. 101. 
126. See COAG, supra note 121. In relation to this last ground for reforming double 
jeopardy, COAG was heavily influenced by the outcome in The Queen v. CarroJJ discussed supra 
Part liLA. 
127. The New South Wales and Queensland provisions do not provide for the relaxation of 
double jeopardy for a subsequent prosecution for an administration of justice offence. 
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all the circumstances it is in the interests of justice that the order be 
made. 128 Only one retrial may be ordered. 
To date, case law on the provisions has been negligible, reflecting 
both their "newness" and the slow pace of the criminal process in serious 
criminal matters as well as the lack of many instances of miscarriage of 
justice deriving from application of the double jeopardy principle. Even 
the Carroll case, which in part generated the reforms, may not of itself 
qualify for retrial under the reforms as the new evidence relating to bite 
marks on the victim was characterized as of "doubtful quality."' 29 In 
other words, even without double jeopardy, Carroll's conviction for 
perjury should have been quashed. 
The promotion of the reforms has been closely tied to technological 
advances in criminal investigation, such as DNA profiling. 130 However, 
there is no empirical evidence indicating the extent to which fresh DNA 
evidence may be available for use during retrial.' 3 ' Older evidence may 
not have been preserved sufficiently well to prevent contamination or 
deterioration. 132 Furthermore, while fresh DNA evidence may be 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in relation to a prior conviction, it is 
another matter entirely to find that DNA evidence will, of itself, most 
likely lead to conviction. There may be a number of reasons why DNA 
profile evidence could be consistent with innocence, such as police or 
scientific misconduct. Ill 
128. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, 2001, pt. 8, div. 2 (N.S.W); Criminal Code, 1899, 
ch. 68 (Queensl.); Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935, pt. 10, div. 3 (S. Austl.). In South 
Australia, the Full Court must be satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial in the 
subsequent prosecution having regard to the effluxion of time between the acquittal and the retrial 
and the failure of the prosecution or the police to act with reasonable diligence or expedition. Id 
129. The Queen v. Carroll [2002] H.C.A. 55; Ex parte Attorney-General (2001) Q.C.A. 
394, 61. 
130. See, e.g., Gareth Griffith & Lenny Roth, DNA Evidence, WrongfUl Convictions and 
WrongfUl Acquittals 39-40 (N.S.W Parliamentary Library Research Serv., Briefmg Paper 
No.ll/06, 2006), available at http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications. 
nsf/key/DNAEvidence,WrongfuiConvictionsandWrongfuiAcquittals (last visited Apr. 8, 2009); 
MCCOC, supra note 99, at 109. 
131. See Chris Corns, Retrial of Acqwited Persons: Time for Reform of the Double 
Jeopardy Rule?, 27 CRIM. L.J. 80, 99 (2003). 
132. Adequate DNA is only available in one out of every five felony cases. David Lazer & 
Michelle N. Meyer, DNA and the Criminal Justice System: Consensus and Debate, in DNA AND 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 359 (David Lazer ed., 2004). 
133. David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England, Part 1: The Exception to the 
Rule Against Double Jeopardy for "New and Compelling EVIdence," 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 
387,431-32 (2006). 
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R The United States 
The concept of double jeopardy dates back well before the signing 
of the United States Constitution;'34 now, the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution is where U.S. citizens find their protected guarantee.135 The 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution states: "[No] person [shall] 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb .... "136 While the language may seem simple on its face, the Clause 
and its wording have been quite difficult to apply through the years. 137 
Double jeopardy has developed to include all criminal charges and all 
ranges of punishment: felonies and misdemeanors, as well as 
imprisonment, fines, or other sanctions. 138 This guarantee can now be 
summarized as prohibiting any criminal defendant from being twice 
criminally punished or prosecuted in any way, for the same offense, by 
the same sovereign. Where the Clause does apply, it is said that "its 
sweep is absolute."139 And, unlike the situation seen in other nations, 
there has been no serious debate in the United States over limiting 
protection here. 
1. Overview 
The concept of double jeopardy can be traced back to ancient 
Greece and Rome.140 The Greek statesman Demosthenes remarked in 
355 B.C.: "[T]he laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same 
issue."141 Double jeopardy evolved slowly in English law, until formally 
written and defined in Sir William Staunford's Les Plees del Coron in 
134. DAVID J. BODENHAMER, OUR RIGHTS 148 (2007) (stating that double jeopardy came to 
the United States from ancient Greece and Rome via English law). 
135. U.S. CoNST. amend. V Double jeopardy protection applies to persons both federally 
and in the states as per incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id amend. XN; Benton 
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) ("Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights 
guarantee is 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' . . . the same constitutional 
standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments." (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 u.s. 145, 149 (1968))). 
136. U.S. CONST. amend. V 
137. Even the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist found the Double Jeopardy Clause a 
challenge: "[T]he decisional law in the area [of double jeopardy] is a veritable Sargasso Sea 
which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." Albemaz v. United States, 
450 u.s. 333, 343 (1981 ). 
138. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,528 (1975) ("Although the constitutional language, 
'jeopardy of life or limb,' suggests proceedings in which only the most serious penalties can be 
imposed, the Clause has long been construed to mean something far broader than its literal 
language."). 
139. Burksv. UnitedStates,437U.S.I, II n.6(1978). 
140. BODENHAMER, supra note 134, at 148. 
141. MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, at vii ( 1969). 
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1557, and Sir Edward Coke's The Institutes on the Laws of England in 
1648. "[N]o man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than 
once, for the same offence."142 Double jeopardy was likely made part of 
the American Bill of Rights-much as other provisions in the Bill of 
Rights-as a "check against a potentially tyrannical government and its 
overzealous prosecutors."143 The Amendment's language broadened the 
prior meaning of double jeopardy so that the guarantee would grant 
greater protection in the United States than in England144 and other 
common law nations. 145 
The unquestioned purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to 
provide protection for the citizens against the great power of the state in 
criminal justice matters. 
[T]he State with all its resources and powers should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby 
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him 
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing 
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.146 
The Founders recognized a need to limit the government's potential for 
abuse, harassment, and oppression so defendants would be protected 
from "run[ ning] the gantlet [sic]" in the court system. 147 
142. Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., The Case o!Ex Parte Lange (or How the Double Jeopardy 
Clause Lost Its "Life or Limb"), 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 53, 62-63 (1999) (quoting 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 335 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1769)). See also JAY A. SIGLER, 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 17 (1969). 
143. Limbaugh, supra note 142, at 66; see also GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: 
THE HiSTORY, THE LAW 50-51 (1998). 
144. See BODENHAMER, supra note 134, at 148 (commenting that the double jeopardy 
clause of the Fifth Amendment would apply to less serious criminal cases rather than only capital 
cases, as in England). 
145. That clearly remains the case today, as discussed above. See supra Part III.A. Indeed, 
some U.S. states grant even greater double jeopardy coverage than is required by the federal 
Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Paulsen, 601 P.2d 634, 636 (Colo. 1979) ("Retrial is precluded 
[under the Colorado Constitution] even when the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting 
the judgment of acquittal."); State v. Lessary, 865 P.2d 150, !56 (Haw. 1994) (holding that "the 
'same conduct' test" bars a second prosecution under state principles); Derado v. State, 622 
N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ind. 1993) (fmding more protection than the federal standard regarding 
conspiracy and the substantive offense); State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d 844, 846 (N.H. 1978) (holding 
that estoppel-limiting sovereignty rules under the federal Constitution are inapplicable under state 
law). 
146. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
147. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,446 (1970); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 
I, 11 (1978) ('"[D]ouble jeopardy' was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to 
the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense." (quoting 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957))); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 
(1971) ("The Fifth Amendment's prohibition against placing a defendant 'twice in jeopardy' 
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Beyond the need to protect defendants, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
was created with the intent of balancing the competing issues of finality 
and accuracy. 148 Society has an interest in convicting a defendant who 
committed a crime. Still, we do not want someone previously acquitted 
of an offense to be ripped from the life she may have had to rebuild and 
be forced to revisit an accusation that was thought to have been 
resolved. 149 
2. What Is Jeopardy? 
Accused persons are only afforded protections from this Clause 
when actually placed in jeopardy.150 The beginning of the placement in 
jeopardy is generally referred to as jeopardy attaching. 151 Jeopardy 
attachment differs depending upon whether the criminal proceeding is a 
jury trial or bench trial. In a jury trial attachment occurs when the entire 
jury is sworn in, and in a nonjury trial jeopardy attaches when the judge 
begins to hear evidence. 152 
The ending of jeopardy is generally referred to as termination. 
After attachment, jeopardy is not barred until termination. A simple 
example of termination is an acquittal, which may be found for a variety 
of reasons, including the court finding the evidence to be legally 
insufficient to support a conviction. 153 The termination requirement is 
also consistent with the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause: to 
balance accuracy and finality. 154 The termination requirement allows for 
exceptions in certain scenarios that are important to our legal system, 
such as the appeals process and retrials in legitimate circumstances.155 
represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit in federal criminal 
proceedings."). 
148. See, e.g., Jam, 400 U.S. at 479. 
149. Of course, double jeopardy does not protect against a criminal and a civil charge (and 
punishment) for the same act. See Schellenbach v. SEC, 989 F.2d 907, 911 (7th Cir. 1993). 
150. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). 
151. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458,471 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
152. Id There are obvious reasons why jeopardy attaches before there is a final judgment; 
the most important is to protect the accused. If jeopardy attached only at fmal judgment, the 
prosecution could "court shop." If the prosecution perceives the trial as going unfavorably, it 
could withdraw from the case, only to recharge the accused in a different jurisdiction or court. 
"[T]he prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity to require an accused to stand 
trial." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). The U.S. courts have been vigilant in 
determining that jeopardy attaches before the fmal judgment in order to avoid court shopping. 
See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963). 
153. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding that when a court fmds that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support a conviction, jeopardy is terminated). 
154. See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,479 (1971). 
155. Such circumstances may include retrials after mistrials and hung juries. Richardson v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 317,324 (1984) (holding that a retrial following a hung jury does not 
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With an appeal, termination occurs when the convicted fails to challenge 
her conviction successfully. Once a defendant files an appeal, she is 
considered to have waived the double jeopardy rights. 156 
3. Protections 
The Double Jeopardy Clause offers protection against subsequent 
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense for which she has been 
convicted, multiple punishments for the same offense, and a later trial of 
the defendant for the same offense for which she has been acquitted. 157 It 
is this last aspect that is of chief concern in this Article, for it is the one 
that has occupied reformers in Australia and elsewhere. 
The protection of the accused from prosecution after an acquittal 
means that "the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to 
convict him." 158 In the United States, there has been considerable 
litigation on the issue of what constitutes an acquittal and when it occurs. 
Procedurally, the protection applies to an acquittal whether it was by the 
court in a bench trial or by a jury verdict. 159 Additionally, an acquittal can 
be an acquittal of the charged offense as well as an acquittal of a 
particular punishment.160 
An acquittal can occur when an offense is dismissed, and that 
acquittal must be treated as final, barring certain conditions. 161 Finality 
requires that the trial has proceeded to the defendant's introduction of 
evidence, and the judge's order of dismissal was facially unqualified at 
rnidtrial. 162 If there is a finding by the court or jury of insufficient 
evidence to establish guilt, that finding will constitute an acquittal and 
reprosecution is barred. 163 This rule has no exceptions no matter the 
cause for the insufficiency. The acquittal and bar to reprosecution stand 
if the insufficiency to support a finding of guilt was caused by 
violate double jeopardy); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 10 I, 109 (2003) (holding that there 
is no violation of double jeopardy to have a retrial following a hung jury, even in a capital case). 
156. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957). 
157. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see also United States v. Halper, 
490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (discussing the three "abuses" protected by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause). 
158. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,343 (1975). 
159. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462,467 (2005). 
160. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,438 (1981) (holding that if a hearing resembles, 
in all relevant respects, a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, a refusal by the jury to impose 
the death penalty can operate as an acquittal of that punishment). 
161. Smith, 543 U.S. at 473. 
162. Id The acquittal is seen "as fmal, unless the availability of reconsideration ha[d] been 
plainly established by pre-existing rule or case authority expressly applicable to midtrial rulings 
on the sufficiency of the evidence." Id 
163. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54,72-73 (1978). 
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prosecutorial error in obtaining or admitting evidence at trial. In stark 
contrast to what is being enacted or proposed elsewhere, double jeopardy 
in the United States bars reprosecution even if new and strongly 
incriminating evidence is later discovered after the finding of insufficient 
evidence to establish guilt.'64 
There is no type of error, exception, or defect of any kind that has 
the power to reverse or change an acquittal in American courts. 165 The 
U.S. courts are quite serious about the finality of an acquittal. To be sure, 
in one important case, the Justices wrote that there is no exception 
permitting retrial once the defendant has been acquitted, no matter how 
"egregiously erroneous" the legal rulings leading to that judgment might 
be.166 Correctness of the ruling for acquittal is not the determining factor; 
rather, it is whether there was a substantive resolution in favor of the 
defendant after jeopardy attached. 167 
4. Double Jeopardy's Limitations 
While the U.S. courts write of double jeopardy protection as 
absolute, in fact several significant limitations-though narrow in 
scope-are present. The most prominent is the so-called "dual 
sovereignty rule." Double jeopardy attaches only to prosecutions for the 
same criminal act by the same jurisdiction. This means that a defendant 
could be charged and .convicted of the same offense twice, as long as 
both charges and convictions were not within the same jurisdiction. The 
rationale behind this double jeopardy limitation is that each sovereign has 
164. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1977) (holding 
that the acquittal stands when the state's evidence is insufficient to establish factual guilt). That is, 
of course, precisely what is being promoted in Australia and in the United Kingdom. See supra 
Part liLA. The most prominent application of the altered rule in the United Kingdom came in 
2006. See David Brown & Frances Gibb, Mother's Relief as Killer Is Convicted Under Double 
Jeopardy Law Refonn, TIMES OF LoNDON, Sept. 12, 2006, at 3, available at http:/tbusiness. 
timesonline.co.uk/toltbusiness/law/article635850.ece. 
165. See, e.g., Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 ( 1984); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784, 797 (1969). 
166. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962). 
167. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571 ("' [A ]cquittal' is not to be controlled by the 
form of the judge's action.... Rather, we must determine whether the ruling of the judge, 
whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual 
elements of the offense charged." (citation omitted)); see also Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 4 76 U.S. 
140, 145 (1986) ("[S]ubjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfmding proceedings going to 
guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause."). For double jeopardy purposes, the 
Court has also found an "implied acquittal" to be of constitutional significance. When a 
defendant is convicted of a lesser included offense, that is an implied acquittal of the greater 
charge, and, thus, subsequent prosecution of the greater charge is barred by double jeopardy. 
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410,421 (1980); see a/so Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) 
(holding petitioner could not be retried for murder having been convicted of manslaughter). 
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its own laws, and thus, has a right to prosecute under its laws. Therefore, 
the previously discussed protections from reprosecution after acquittal 
and against multiple punishments would not apply with multiple 
prosecutions by different sovereigns. The following are all viewed as 
separate sovereigns: federal and a state,168 two states,169 or the military 
and a state.170 
Reprosecution is allowed under double jeopardy when the 
defendant has moved for a mistrial. On the other hand, actions on the 
part of the prosecution resulting in a mistrial will nearly always restrict 
reprosecution. One exception to the bar on reprosecution falls within the 
category of manifest necessity. 171 The theory is that "the defendant's 
interest in proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing and 
equally legitimate demand for public justice."172 A "high degree" of 
necessity must be present. 173 Most commonly, as noted above, the 
exception has been applied in cases involving hung juries. 174 The 
government claim of no fault in creating the necessity for a new trial is 
carefully scrutinized. "[T]he prosecutor must shoulder the burden of 
justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar."175 
*** 
The Double Jeopardy Clause is seen as an extremely important 
protection in the United States. There are certain complexities associated 
with the right as well as some exceptions and limitations; however, the 
United States Constitution maintains strictly the protection the Clause 
affords. The United States has, historically and recently, offered a 
stringent guarantee, and has never seriously challenged the need for the 
168. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 
187, 192 (1959). 
169. Heath v.Alabama, 474 U.S. 82,88 (1985). 
170. See, e.g., United States v. Ragan!, 56 M.J. 852, 856 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2002). A 
tribal court is an additional, separate sovereign. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) 
(holding that an Indian tribal court can prosecute nonmembers who have been previously 
prosecuted elsewhere, and that prosecution will not amount to an exercise offederal power). 
171. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). 
172. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973) (citing Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 
(1949)). 
173. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978) ("'[N]ecessity' cannot be 
interpreted literally; instead, contrary to the teaching of Webster, we assume that there are degrees 
of necessity and we require a 'high degree' before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate."). 
174. See United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14, 15-16 (1976)(holding that the government 
was not precluded on the double jeopardy ground from retrying defendants where the first trial 
ended in a mistrial of manifest necessity because of a hung jury). See also United States v. 
Mauskar, 557 F.3d 219,228 (5th Cir. 2009). 
175. Washington, 434 U.S. at 505. 
366 TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP LAW [Vol. 18 
basic principles. This view is consistent with the skepticism seen 
elsewhere as to the power of the government to prosecute its citizens. 
The Australian view, too, is consistent with what we saw earlier in several 
areas such as the rule of exclusion and entrapment. Without deeply 
ingrained skepticism as to the role of government in this process, leaders 
in some Australian states seem willing to grant greater power to the 
government to prosecute bad people more than once. 
IV. SENTENCING 
A. The Umted States 
"Our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our 
sentences too long." 
-Justice Anthony M. Kennedy176 
1. Introduction 
For decades now, the United States has punished its criminal 
offenders quite severely. 177 Indeed, the sense has been that such 
punishment may be appropriate when, relatively speaking, tremendous 
protections are offered to defendants in the criminal justice process. 178 
With one in every 131 of its citizens behind bars,179 the United States is 
176. Frank J. Murray, Supreme Court Justice Urges Shorter Sentences; Justice Kennedy 
Wants' Repeal of Mandatory Sentences Aller Voting that They Are Constitutional, WASH. TIMES, 
Aug. 10,2003, atAl. 
1 77. In this Part, we will generalize about the current situation in the United States, but this 
approach is difficult and the reader should be cautioned that states have widely different views on 
the matter, as is allowed by the U.S. system of federalism. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GoRDON 
HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 137, 137 (1991). The authors there correctly note that 
the punishment systems in the fifty states and U.S. federal system are so different from one 
another that they could be viewed as fifty-one different countries. Id 
Moreover, in this Article, we will not discuss capital punishment. At this point, we can add 
very little to the intense debate in the United States and the settled question in Australia. Capital 
punishment was banned in Australia in 1973. For history in this area and international 
comparisons, see generally Paul Marcus, Capital Punishment in the United States and Beyond, 31 
MELB. U. L. REv. 837 (2007). See also Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Facts About the Death Penalty 
(2009), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf(stating that currently in the United States, 
the numbers of capital prosecutions, death sentences, and executions are much lower than in the 
past). 
178. See generally Marcus & Waye, supra note 1. 
179. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Growth in Prison 
and Jail Populations Slowing: 16 States Report Declines in the Number of Prisoners (Mar. 31, 
2009) (reflecting information as of June 30, 2008). For an excellent overview of the current 
issues in the United States regarding sentencing, see Kevin R. Reitz, Reporter's Study: The 
Question of Parole Release Authority, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 1 (Discussion Draft 
No. 2, 2009). See also Dahlia Lithwick, Our Real Prison Problem; My Are We So Womed 
About Gitmo?, NEWSWEEK, June 15,2009, at 28. 
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currently facing an incarceration crisis of epic proportions. Since the 
determinate sentencing movement of the 1970s, the number of 
individuals incarcerated in the United States has increased seven-fold, 
with current prison and jail populations reaching 2.3 million.180 With 
about just 5% of the world's population, the United States has 25% of the 
world's reported prisoners. 181 As of 2008, the United States had the 
highest known incarceration rate in the world with 762 inmates per 
100,000 people.182 Federal, state, and local spending on prisons and jails 
currently totals more than $68 billion a year. 183 This incarceration crisis 
has disproportionally impacted racial minorities, with 40% of the 
individuals in prisons and jails being African American and 20% being 
Hispanic. 184 Furthermore, it has disrupted families and communities 
across the nation, leaving some 1. 7 million children with a parent behind 
bars in 2007. 185 
2. History of Sentencing in the United States 
In colonial times, the English imposed determinate, or fixed, 
sentences for felony offenses.186 This practice of determinate sentencing 
left little discretion to trial court judges-once a jury found a defendant 
guilty of a felony beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence for the 
180. See The Sentencing Project, Facts About Prisons and Prisoners (Apr. 2009), 
http://sentencing project.org/doc/publications/inc_factsaboutprison.pdf. 
181. Jim Webb, J.WJy We Must Fix Our Prisons, PARADE, Mar. 29, 2009, at 4, available at 
http://www.parade.com/news/2009/03/why-we-must-fix-our-prisons.html. 
In 1984, Japan had a population half the size of ours and was incarcerating 40,000 
sentenced offenders, compared with 580,000 in the United States. As shocking as that 
disparity was, the difference between the countries now is even more astounding-and 
profoundly disturbing. Since then, Japan's prison population has not quite doubled to 
71,000, while ours has quadrupled to 2.3 million. 
Id See generally Mary Beth Lipp, A New Perspective on the "War on Drugs'~· Comparing the 
Consequences of Sentencing Policies in the United States and England, 3 7 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 979 
(2004). 
182. Compare HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008-STATISTICAL TABLES 2 tbl.l (Mar. 2009) (reflecting statistics as of 
midyear 2008), with Webb, supra note 181, at 4 (reporting a slightly lower rate of incarceration-
756 inmates per 100,000 residents). 
183. See Webb, supra note 181, at4. 
184. The Sentencing Project, supra note 180. 
185. SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND 
THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991-2007, at 2 (2009), available athttp://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
Admin/Documents/publications/inc_incarceratedparents.pdf. 
186. Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 
VAL. U. L. REv. 693, 693 (2005). 
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defendant's crime was set. 187 In this way, a felony defendant "knew from 
the face of the charging instrument precisely what sentence she would 
receive if convicted."'88 
The English colonial practice of determinate sentencing was not, 
however, readily embraced by the Americans, who began criticizing the 
practice because it did not allow for individualized determinations of 
punishment.189 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Congress and 
the states had repealed their determinate sentences as part of a continued 
trend away from fixed sentencing and towards legislatively prescribed 
ranges for imprisonment, giving judges increased sentencing 
discretion. 190 "[A]ppellate review of sentencing was virtually non-
existent"'9' during this time period, allowing judges an "enormous and 
essentially unbridled authority to impose a sentence anywhere within the 
legislatively prescribed range."192 
During the mid-nineteenth century, Americans began to view 
imprisonment as a means of both moral reform193 and penance.'94 Prisons 
became known as "penitentiaries" and states expended a considerable 
amount of money on their construction. 195 However, by 1865, "the 
reformatory ideals of the penitentiary had largely given way to the 
practical realities of modem imprisonment, with overcrowding and 
brutality among prisoners and staff a grim reality."'96 About one hundred 
years ago, the "rehabilitation model" came into favor. 197 "Prisons were 
re-conceptualized from places of penance and punishment to institutions 
for the transformation of offenders into law-abiding citizens."198 Then, in 
1910, the first federal prisoners were paroled, and by 1930 the Board of 
Parole, later known as the United States Parole Commission, was 
187. Id According to Professor Klein, "[t]he judicial role was largely a ministerial one-
impose that sentence mandated by the jury verdict." Id 
188. Id at 696. The sentence ordered was usually ''the death penalty or a fme [that] varied 
according to the value of the property stolen." Id Nonfelony offenses were usually not punished 
by imprisonment, but rather by "whipping, fines, banishment, and public humiliations, such as 
time in the stocks." PAUL J. HOFER ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIITEEN YEARS OF 
GUIDELINES SENTENCING 41 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_study_full.pdf. 
189. Klein, supra note 186, at 696. 
190. /dat697. 
191. Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The US. Sentencing Commissions 
Troubling Silence About the Purposes of Punishmen~ 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. I 043, I 050 (2003). 
192. Klein, supra note 186, at 697. 
193. HOFERET AL., supra note 188, at 41. 
194. Id at 1. 
195. Id at 41. To be sure, Europeans such as Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United 
States with the specific purpose of studying these penitentiaries. Id 
196. Id 
197. Id at I; Klein, supra note 186, at 698. 
198. HOFER ET AL., supra note 188, at 1. 
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established.199 Parole boards throughout the nation began to consider a 
prisoner's behavior and progress towards rehabilitation in deciding when 
his/her sentence would end.200 The flexibility of indeterminate sentencing 
allowed for this personally tailored approach to incarceration. 
Both the practice of indeterminate sentencing and the rehabilitation 
model were in place for much of the twentieth century.201 Belief in the 
efficacy of the rehabilitative model, however, began to falter by the late 
1970s.202 This was largely due to a "growing mistrust of a 'therapeutic 
state"' coupled with the fact that there was no "strong evidence for the 
effectiveness of correctional treatment programs."203 Plus, the respective 
rates of crime and recidivism were high.204 At the same time, concerns 
about the practice of indeterminate sentencing were growing.205 Many 
Americans were troubled by the amount of discretion given to judges 
under the indeterminate system and felt that it resulted in ''unwarranted 
disparities [in the sentences] for similarly situated defendants." 206 
Another major criticism of indeterminate sentencing was that it resulted 
in punishments that were overly lenient. 207 Reformers began to advocate 
for punishments that were uniform and proportional to the severity of the 
offense.208 The focus was no longer on the offender's potential for 
rehabilitation, but rather on the danger posed to the community.209 
In the midst of this reform, several states passed mandatory 
minimum laws.210 The key reform against indeterminate sentencing was 
199. U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 1 (2003), available at 
http://www. usdoj .gov/uspc/history. pdf 
200. HOFERET AL., supmnote 188, at 41-42. 
201. Rappaport, supmnote 191, at 1049-50. 
202. HOFERET AL., supmnote 188, at 2. 
203. Id at2. 
204. David Yellen, Saving Fedeml Sentencing Reform After Apprendi, Blakely and 
Booker, 50 VILL. L. REv. 163, 165 (2005). 
205. HOFER ET AL., supm note 188, at 2, 42; Klein, supm note 186, at 699; Rappaport, 
supmnote 191, at 1050-53. 
206. Klein, supm note 186, at 699. Critics pointed to evidence that the disparities were 
attributable to factors like "geography, race, gender, socio-economic status, and judicial 
philosophy" and not to factors like criminal history, potential for rehabilitation, or the nature of 
the circumstances surrounding the crime. Id; see also Rappaport, supm note 191, at I 050-52. 
207. HOFERET AL., supmnote 188, at 42; Rappaport, supmnote 191, at 1052-53. 
208. HOFERETAL.,supmnote 188,at42. 
209. Id The United States was certainly not the only nation to have taken this approach 
during this period. See Stephan Terblanche & Geraldine Mackenzie, Mandatory Sentences in 
SouthA/iica: Lessons for Australia?, 41 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRiMINOLOGY 402,406-07 (2008). 
210. See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDAJDRY MINIMuMS FOUND. (FAMMF), HISTORY OF 
MANDATORY SENTENCES I (2005), http://www.farnm.org/Repository/Fi!es/Updated%20short"/o20 
HISTORY.pdf. For example, New York enacted its famous Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973. Id 
These laws established mandatory minimum fifteen year sentences for certain drug offenses. Id 
Shortly thereafter, in 1978, Michigan passed its 650 Lifer Law which imposed a mandatory 
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the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).211 It made some 
drastic changes to the federal sentencing system in the United States, 
creating an expert agency called the United States Sentencing 
Commission (U.S.S.C.).212 It called upon the new agency to draft federal 
sentencing guidelines.213 Unsurprisingly, one of the central goals of the 
SRA was to "avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
criminal conduct." 214 The U.S.S.C. issued its federal sentencing 
guidelines in 1987.215 The guidelines set up a determinate sentencing 
system under which a criminal offender's sentence was fixed based upon 
a variety offactors.216 Furthermore, under the SRA, a court was required 
to follow the sentencing guidelines unless there was "an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission."217 
In addition to creating the U.S.S.C., the SRA also abolished the 
Federal Parole Commission. This was seen by many as being the "final 
minimwn life sentence without parole for anyone found with 650 grams of certain kinds of drugs 
like cocaine and heroin. Id; see Drug Policy Alliance Network, Rockefeller Drug Laws, 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/statebystate/newyork/rockefellerd/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2010); Yellen, 
supra note 204, at 167 ("[I]n 1980, Minnesota became the first state to promulgate sentencing 
guidelines, followed by Pennsylvania in 1982 and Washington in 1984 ."). 
211. 28 u.s.c. §§ 991-998 (2006). 
212. Id § 991. 
213. Id § 994. 
214. Id § 991(b)(1)(B). The four central purposes of punishment identified by the SRA 
were also unsurprising given the shift away from the rehabilitation model and the concerns of 
reformers about the leniency of indeterminate sentencing. These purposes, listed in the SRA, 
were: 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006). 
215. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission 
I (2005), http://www.ussc.gov/general!USSCoverview.pdf. 
216. These guidelines, contained in the Federal Sentencing Manual, established a 
determinate sentence (within a 25% discretionary range) for each offender according to the 
offense of conviction, offender characteristics, circwnstances surrounding the offense, and 
relevant conduct not accounted for by the indictment. Unlike the determinate sentencing system 
in place in England and very early American colonial times, where all essential elements 
necessary to a particular determinate sentence were determined by a jury, many of the facts 
mandating a particular enhanced sentence under the Guidelines were found by the judge using a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. The role of the judge here was later sharply curtailed by 
the Supreme Court. See infia text accompanying notes 224-225. 
217. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); seeHOFERET AL., supra note 188, at 7. 
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nail in the coffin of federal indeterminate sentencing."218 It meant that 
"[a ]bsent an appellate reversal or a presidential pardon, the fixed 
sentence imposed by the district judge pursuant to the guidelines would 
be served, in full, by the offender."219 The SRA also added harsher 
mandatory minimums to many sections of the United States Code.220 The 
net effect of the SRA was a dramatic reduction in judicial discretion 
when it came to federal sentencing decisions. This approach was widely 
followed in many states.221 
In the years following the passage of the SRA, both Congress and 
state legislatures began passing mandatory minimum laws, and by 1994 
all fifty states and the District of Columbia had versions of such laws.222 
The 1990s also saw a proliferation of so-called three-strikes laws, with 
nearly half of all states enacting such laws between 1993 and 1995.223 
Soon thereafter, an important line of Supreme Court cases indicated that 
enhancement of a sentence under the guidelines beyond the maximum 
amount based upon facts not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury 
violated the United States Constitution, specifically the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial. 224 The Court also held that the 
sentencing guidelines were advisory, not mandatory.225 Taken together, 
these decisions were properly viewed as a victory against strictly 
determinate sentencing and a major win in the battle to reclaim judicial 
discretion. 
218. Klein,supmnote 186,at701. 
219. Id at 702. 
220. Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 413, 445-46 (1992) (citing 
amendments to the U.S.S.G.). 
221. FAMMF, supmnote 210. 
222. David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Under Mandatory Minimwn Sentencing, 48 J.L. & EcON. 591, 591 (2005). 
223. Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws, 
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 89 (2001). 
The laws vary, but most call for life sentences without the possibility of release for at 
least 25 years upon a third conviction of a serious violent crime. The crimes include 
murder, rape, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and sexual abuse. A 
few states include additional crimes, most commonly firearm violations, burglary of 
occupied dwellings, and simple robbery. The rationale for the laws is that the longer 
prison terms reduce crime by deterring and incapacitating the most active and 
dangerous criminals. 
Jd at 89-90 (footnotes omitted). 
224. See United States v. Booker 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprenmand Blake.(yapplied to state 
sentencing guidelines. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Bookerhowever, 
made it clear that the holdings were applicable under the federal sentencing guidelines as well. 
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
225. Booker, 543 U.S. at245. 
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With prison populations soaring, states began to enact significant 
reforms against determinate sentencing during this time period.226 And, 
as noted below, states began a return to the expansion of treatment 
programs, the reform of parole and probation systems, and establishment 
of alternatives to imprisonment for nonviolent offenders.227 
3. Impact of Severe Sentencing 
Much has been written about the consequences of the determinate 
sentencing movement and harsh punishments of the past decades.228 One 
of the most frequently cited consequences of determinate sentencing is 
the high rate at which American citizens are incarcerated. 229 This high 
incarceration rate has greatly impacted the American economy at the 
226. See RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, CHANGING DIRECTION?: STATE 
SENTENCING REFORMS 2004-2006, at 3 (2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
Admin/Documents/publications/sentencingreforrnforweb.pdf; see also FAMMF, supra note 210. 
Michigan repealed its 650-lifer laws in 1998 and passed sweeping reforms of its mandatory 
minimum laws in 2002, New York revised its Rockefeller Drug Laws in 2004, and California 
passed a proposition mandating treatment, instead of imprisonment, for nonviolent first and 
second drug offenders in 2000. FAMMF, supra note 210. Both California and New York are in 
the middle of serious reviews of their criminal justice systems, particularly focusing on 
sentencing and imprisonment. See Jeremy W Peters, Albany Reaches Deal To Repeal '70s Drug 
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at AI; California May Have To Cut Prison Population by 40 
Percent (Feb. I 0, 2009), http:/ /www.cnn.com/2009/CRlME/02/l 0/california.prisons/. Changes 
will need to be substantial in order to make much of an impact. N.Y. Times Opinionator Blog, 
California Will Survive Its Crackup, http:/legan.blogs.nytimes.corn/2009/05/20/California-will-
survive-its-crackup/ (May 20, 2009, 22:00 EST) (stating that California has 750,000 people in 
prison or jail, or on parole or probation). The most recent development in California is a federal 
court order mandating the release of 40,000 state prisoners because of an unconstitutional health 
system in the prisons. Solomon Moore, Califol711a Prisons Must Cut Inmate Population, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, atA9. 
The debate over sentencing has spilled over into serious discussions of other significant 
aspects of the criminal justice system in the United States. For striking examples of this in media 
coverage, see Steven B. Duke, Drugs: To Legalize or Not, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2009, at I; 
Jennifer Steinhauer, To Cut Costs, States Relax Hard Line on Prison Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
25, 2009, at AI; Editorial, A Sensible Call for Sentencing Refonn: Virgima's Junior Senator 
Insists on Taking an Honest Look at the High Cost of the War on Drugs, ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 
13, 2008, at B8; Editorial, Go After the Real Problem, DAILY PREss (Va.), Mar. 31, 2009, at C5, 
available at http://articles.dailypress.com/2009-03-31/news/0903300070_l_prison-refonn-four-
prisoners-prison-system; Editorial, Reviewing Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at 
A28. 
227. See inffa Part V. 
228. See, e.g., Nekima Levy-Pounds, From the Frying Pan into the Fire: How Poor 
Women of Color and Children are Affected by Sentencing Gwdelines and Mandatory Minimums, 
47 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 285 (2007); Editorial, The 'War on Drugs' Is Over, May 16, 2009, at 
A28; MARc MAIJER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE 
WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY (2007), http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
Admin/Documents/publications/dp_25yearquagmire.pdf. 
229. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, in 
37 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 97, 97-98 (Michael Tonry ed., 2008). 
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federal, state, and local levels; American families and communities; and 
the entire democratic system. 
With 1 in every 131 Americans incarcerated in a prison or a jail,230 it 
is clear that the increase in the incarceration rate has not been a gradual 
one rising slowly throughout the twentieth century. It has skyrocketed to 
remarkable levels since the determinate sentencing movement of the 
1970s.231 In fact, from 1970 to the middle of 2008, the number of 
individuals incarcerated in federal and state prisons increased by almost 
seven-fold,232 and from 1980 to 2007 the number of incarcerated drug 
offenders in federal, state, and local prisons/jails increased by 1200%.233 
As would be expected given the prevalence of mandatory minimums for 
drug and other nonviolent offenses, state prisons are now populated with 
low-level offenders-in 2004, 82% of the individuals sentenced to state 
prisons were nonviolent offenders, with 34% of them convicted for drug 
offenses and 29% for property offenses.234 
The incarceration crisis has not impacted the U.S. population 
equally, however. According to The Sentencing Project, "Black males 
have a 32% chance of serving time in prison at some point in their lives" 
and "[h ]ispanic males have a 17% chance"-in sharp contrast with white 
males who have a 6% chance.235 With respect to drug offences, African-
Americans make up "37% of those arrested on drug charges[,] 59% of 
those convicted," and 74% of those sentenced to prison.236 African-
Americans constitute about 14% of the nation's monthly drug users.237 
230. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 179. 
231. Jim Webb, National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009: The Scope of the 
Problem, http://webb.senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/upload/SlidesCrimina!JusticeBill.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2010) (PowerPoint presentation); HOFERET AL., supra note 188, at 39. 
232. The Sentencing Project, supra note 180; HOFER ET AL., supra note 188, at 39. 
233. Webb, supra note 231. 
234. The Sentencing Project, supra note 180 (finding in 2007 that 47.5% of all drug arrests 
in the United States were for marijuana offenses); Webb, supra note 181. Furthermore, of those 
serving out drug offenses in state prisons, 60% of offenders were nonviolent and did not have a 
significant history of selling drugs. Id 
235. The Sentencing Project, supra note 180. 
236. Webb, supra note 231. 
237. Id; see also Charles J. Ogletree, Testimony of Charles Ogletree: Discdminatory 
Impact of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in the United States, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 273, 275 
(2006). The scope of the incarceration crisis and its discriminatory impact become even larger, 
however, when the number of individuals on parole and probation is factored in. In 2008, 
approximately five million Americans were on parole, probation, or were receiving some other 
community sanction. Webb, supra note 231. Added together with the 2.3 million Americans 
incarcerated in federal and state prisons and in local jails, the total becomes 7.3 million 
Americans in the corrections system. Id 
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a. Economic Impact 
As would be expected, the costs of incarcerating and overseeing 
millions of people are staggeringly high. Almost $70 billion238 is spent 
per year at the federal, state, and local levels, making the high rates of 
incarceration a substantial contributor to many states' budget problems.239 
With one of the highest incarceration rates in the nation, California 
is the clearest example of a state whose budget has been greatly affected 
by the costs of corrections. According to the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, the average yearly cost per inmate in 
2008 and 2009-in nonconstruction costs-was $35,587 and per parolee 
was $4338. 240 The proposed 2009-2010 California state budget for 
corrections is $9.9 billion (7.3% ofthe total expenditures for the state).241 
It is not the only state in trouble. In Florida, the average yearly cost per 
inmate in fiscal year 2007-2008 was $20,108 or about $55.09 per day42 
(74% on operations, 24% on health services, and 2% on education).243 
Florida's corrections budget totaled more than $2 billion (8.5% of the 
state general revenue budget).244 Mississippi, a state with the second 
highest imprisonment rate for sentenced prisoners, spent an average daily 
amount of $49.13 per inmate in the 2008 fiscal year. 245 
238. See Webb, supra note 181, at 4. 
239. Solomon Moore, In US. Prison Spending Outpaces All But Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2009, atA13. 
240. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., PRESENTATION TO 
SENATE BUDGET SUBCOMMmEE No. 4 ON STATE ADMINISTRATION 4 (Mar. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2009/CDCR_ 03_19 _09 .pdf. 
241. ARNOLD SCHW ARZENEGGER, STATE OF CAL., GoVERNOR'S BUDGET SUMMARY 2009-
10, at 13 fig.SUM-07 (Jan. 9, 2009), available athttp://www.dof.ca.gov/budgetlhistoricaV2009-
l 0/governors/summary/documents/FullBudgetSummary.pdf; see also Joan Peters ilia, California s 
Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, in 37 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEw OF 
RESEARCH, supra note 229, at 207, 222 ("The California prison system is incredibly 
expensive. . . . California has continuously shifted resources toward prisons and away from other 
areas. Between 1984 and 2006, overall state expenditures increased 294 percent but expenditures 
for adult corrections increased 1,094 percent. Expenditures for social services increased 182 
percent; health services, 371 percent; and mental health services, 241 percent."). 
California expects a $42 billion deficit. California Budget Crisis Jeopardizes 20,000 Jobs (Feb. 
17, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02117 /Califomia.budget.crisis/index.html. 
242. Fla. Dep't of Corr., Cost of Imprisonment (June 2009), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/ 
statsbrief/cost.html. 
243. FLA. DEP'T OF CORR., BUDGET SUMMARY (FY 2007-08), available at http://www.dc. 
state.fl.us/pub/annuaV0708/budget.html. 
244. Fla. Dep't ofCorr., supra note 242. 
245. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON PERFORMANCE EVALUATION & EXPENDITURE REVIEW 
(PEER), MISS. DEP'T OF CORR., MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS' FY 2008 COST PER 
INMATE DAY 4 (Dec. 9, 2008), available athttp://www.peer.state.ms.us/reports/rpt517.pdf. 
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b. Societal Impact 
The high incarceration rate is not just an economic problem, it is a 
daily reality for families and communities across the nation. In 2007, 
over half (52%) of all incarcerated men and women were parents, leaving 
a total of 1.7 million children nationwide with a parent in prison.246 The 
number of incarcerated mothers skyrocketed from 1991 to 2007, 
increasing by 122% during that time period. 247 The number of 
incarcerated fathers increased by 76% during the same time period.248 
Communities are also greatly affected by high incarceration rates. 
Social networks are disrupted when adults belonging to the community 
cycle in and out of prison. 249 Incarceration often causes marital 
relationships to deteriorate and results in an increased number of single 
parents and female-headed households. 250 In addition, with large 
numbers of males being incarcerated, the gender ratios of communities 
are altered, which in turn can have a negative impact on community 
health.251 
4. Recent Developments 
Since 2000, most U.S. states have enacted some measures to combat 
the rising prison population and the costs, economic and otherwise, 
associated with it.252 The recent economic crisis has "increased the 
urgency" of resolving the incarceration cost problems.253 In an attempt to 
246. SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND 
THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991-2007, at 2 (2009), available athttp://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
Admin/Documents/publications/inc_incarceratedparents.pdf (reporting that the number of 
children with an incarcerated parent has increased 82% since 1991 ). 
247. /d 
248. Id The impact on a child with an incarcerated parent can be substantial. Such 
children are often raised by a relative or placed in foster care, especially if the mother is the one 
incarcerated. Id at 1. Children frequently lose contact with their incarcerated parent. Id In 
2004, for example, 59% of parents incarcerated in state prisons and 45% of those incarcerated in 
federal prisons said they were never visited by their children. Id at 2. In addition to losing 
contact with their incarcerated parent, these children are "more likely to drop out of school, 
engage in delinquency, and subsequently be incarcerated themselves." Id at 1. 
249. Clear, supra note 229, at 106-07. 
250. Seeidat111-12. 
251. /dat113-14. 
252. See RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2008: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
Admin/Documents/publications/sl_statesentencingreport2008.pdf. 
253. Id; see also Steinhauer, supra note 226. A New liJik Tiineseditorial pointed out that 
"[h]ard-pressed states and localities that reduce prison costs will have more money to help the 
unemployed, avert layoffs of teachers and police officers, and keep hospitals operating." 
Reviewing Criminal Justice, supra note 226. 
376 TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 18 
save money, some states are closing prisons. 254 To cut back on the 
number of individuals in prisons, other states began sanctioning parole 
violators with community service instead of jail time or enhancing 
credits toward release.255 
There is serious discussion on reform of the determinate sentencing 
practice at the national level. Last year several U.S. senators proposed 
the National Criminal Justice Commission Act of2009.256 The Act would 
create a commission "charged with undertaking an 18-month, top-to-
bottom review of [the] entire criminal justice system."257 The task of the 
Commission would be "to propose concrete, wide-ranging reforms 
designed to [responsibly] reduce the overall incarceration rate; improve 
federal and local responses to international and domestic gang 
violence; ... restructure [the] approach to drug policy; improve the 
treatment of mental illness; improve prison administration; and establish 
a system for reintegrating ex-offenders.'ms The Act currently has strong 
support from the Senate leadership and the backing of the Obama 
Administration. 259 
*** 
In the United States, we have seen remarkable changes in our 
sentencing patterns over the past years. With strong constitutional 
protections for those convicted of crimes, Americans were not reluctant 
to get tough on crime, choosing to "[l]ock em up and throw away the 
key!"260 We are, however, now seeing a dramatic rethinking of such a 
harsh regime. 
254. Steinhauer, supra note 226. 
255. Id 
256. Jim Webb, Sen. Webb's National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009 (Oct. 
2009), http:l/webb.senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/National-Criminal-Justice-Commission-Act-
of-2009-fact-sheet.cfm. One sponsoring senator and former prosecutor, Arlen Spector of 
Pennsylvania, stated the matter succinctly: "We call it a correctional system, but we all know it 
doesn't correct." Bill Sizemore, Webb Takes on Pnson System in "Crisis, "VA. PILar, June 13, 
2009, at A8. There appears also to be support for change from the general public. SeeTHE2009 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COALITION, SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT 
ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 54 (Nov. 5, 2008), available at http://www.constitutionproject. 
org/manage/file/62.pdf (80% of Americans favor community service for nonviolent offenders). 
257. Webb, supra note 256. 
258. Id 
259. Id 
260. Briane Dumaine, New ~apons in the Crime War, FoimJNE, June 3, 1991, available 
at http:/ /money.cnn.corn/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/ 1991/06/03/7 5076/index.htm. 
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B. Australia 
Australian sentencing is largely entrusted to judicial discretion. 
This is in contrast to the position in the United States, where unstructured 
judicial discretion in sentencing has been rejected in favor of executive 
and legislative constraints perceived to more closely align sentencing 
with community expectations. In Australia there is a strong view that 
individual judges, and not the legislature, should own the sentencing 
process.261 Mandatory sentences and mandatory sentencing guidelines 
are therefore the exception, rather than the rule.262 
Nonetheless, the public role in sentencing in Australia is greater 
than it has ever been 263 and, despite legislative exhortations that 
imprisonment should be a last resort,264 increasingly punitive sentencing 
is a common feature of the Australian criminal justice system.265 Even so, 
Australian incarceration rates remain well below those in the United 
States. In 2007 and 2008, the national rate of imprisonment was 162.6 
prisoners per 100,000 Australian adults, 266 whereas the noncustodial 
sentence rate was 337.5 offenders per 100,000 Australian adults.267 This 
compares with an incarceration rate of 976 per 100,000 adults in the 
261. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATIERS I 78 ( 1996); see also GERALDINE MACKENZIE, 
HOW JUDGES SENTENCE 43 (2005). 
262. See, e.g., Criminal Code Act, 1913, § 401(4)(a) (W. Austl.) (imposing a minimum 
sentence of twelve months imprisonment for repeat offences of burglary); see also Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999, pt. 4, div. lA (N.S.W.) (imposing standard nonparole periods 
for particular crimes). Just this past year, in August 2009, Western Australia implemented 
mandatory sentencing for assaulting police officers. Criminal Code Amendment Bill, 2008, § 4 
(W.Austl.). 
263. See KAREN GELB, VIer. SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS: 
PUBLIC OPINION VERSUS PuBLIC JUDGMENT ABOUT SENTENCING, at v-vi (2006); KAREN GELB, 
VICT. SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, MORE MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 5 (2008) [hereinafter 
GELB, MORE MYTHS]. 
264. See, e.g., Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999, § 5(1) (N.S.W.); Sentencing Act, 
1991, § 5(2E) (Viet.); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act, 1988, § II (S. Austl.); Penalties and 
Sentences Act, 1992, § 9(2)(a)(i) (Queens!.); Sentencing Act, 1995, § 6(4) (W. Austl.). Note, 
however, that in Queensland, the principle of last resort has been abolished for offences involving 
threatened or actual violence or where harm is inflicted on a victim. Penalties and Sentences Act, 
1992, § 9(3) (Queens!.). 
265. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. For example, in 2004 the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics reported that in the previous ten years Australia's prison population grew by 
40% whereas Australia's general population only increased by 15% during the same time. Press 
Release, Austl. Bureau of Statistics, Population Increased by 40% over Past I 0 Years (Dec. 23, 
2004), http://www.abs.gov.au.AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf!PreviousProducts/4517.0Media%20Releani 
2004?opendocument&tabname=surnmary&prodno=4517.0&issue=2004&num=view=. Between 
2004 and 2008, imprisonment rates continued to climb. AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 4517.0 
PRISONERS IN AUSTRALIA 16 (2008) [hereinafter PRISONERS]. 
266. STEERING COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF GOV'T SERV. PROVISION, PRODUCTIVITY 
COMM'N, REPORT ON GoVERNMENT SERVICES 2009, at 8.5 (2009) [hereinafter STEERING COMM.]. 
267. Id at 8.9. 
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United States, 129 per 100,000 adults in Canada, 167 per 100,000 adults 
in England, and 230 per 100,000 adults in New Zealand.268 Based on 
these figures, the United States is clearly the outlier and Australia sits 
comfortably within the range of incarceration rates imposed by 
comparable common law jurisdictions. Interestingly, however, one 
Australian state, the Northern Territory, has an imprisonment rate of 697 
per 100,000 adults,269 which is more analogous to the United States' 
incarceration rate. The reasons proffered for the divergence between the 
Northern Territory and other Australian states relate to the larger number 
of socially disadvantaged indigenous people living in remote areas 
distant from supportive correctional services, as well as a lack of 
rehabilitative programs provided to prisoners.270 Less convincingly, the 
Northern Territory has also explained that as a result of a smaller 
population and smaller numbers of prisoners, minor increases in prison 
populations can result in significant changes in incarceration rates. 271 
Average imprisonment terms are also generally shorter in Australia. 
Excluding prisoners with indeterminate, life, and periodic detention 
sentences, the median aggregate sentence length for sentenced prisoners 
in 2008 was approximately three years.272 Only 5% of prisoners were 
serving a life term or other indeterminate sentence, whereas 58% of 
Australian prisoners were serving less than five years of jail time.273 By 
comparison, prison sentences in state courts (excluding life sentences) in 
the United States averaged almost five years.274 
As in the United States, incarceration rates vary disproportionately 
for certain segments of the population. In Australia, between 2007 and 
268. Trends in the Use of Full-Time lmprisonmen~ SENTENCING TRENDS & ISSUES 
(Judicial Comm'n of N.S.W., Sydney, Austl.), Nov. 2007, at 1, 3 fig.2; see supra text 
accompanying note 182. 
269. AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 4512.0 CORRECTIVE SERVICES 4 (Mar. Quarter 2009). 
270. See STEERING COMM., supra note 266, at 8.40. Although the Northern Territory 
adopted mandatory sentencing for property offences between 1997 and 2001, following its repeal 
on the basis that the sentences did not act as an effective deterrent, incarceration rates have 
continued to escalate. See OFFICE OF CRIME PREVENTION, N. TERR., MANDATORY SENTENCING 
FOR ADULT PROPERTY OFFENDERS: THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXPERIENCE 2, 13 (2003), available 
at 
http://www.nt.gov.au/justice/policycoordldocuments/statistics/mandatory_sentencing_nt_experien 
ce_2003120l.pdf. 
271. STEERING COMM., supra note 266, at 8.4. This reason is not particularly convincing 
because incarceration rates in the Northern Territory have been substantially higher than other 
Australian states for some time. See OFFICE OF CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 270, at 7. 
272. See PRISONERS, supra note 265, at 30. 
273. Id 
274. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons 2004, 
tb1.1.3, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/scsctU4_HC.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 
2010). 
2010] AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES 379 
2008, the "standardised imprisonment rate per 100,000 Indigenous 
adults ... was 1630.4 compared with a corresponding rate of 128.2 for 
non-Indigenous prisoners."275 However, this does not necessarily mean 
that sentencing of indigenous offenders in Australia is racially biased. 
The national rate of community-based corrections, that is, noncustodial 
sentences for the same period, "was 3288.2 per 100,000 Indigenous 
adults compared with 271.1 for non-Indigenous offenders," suggesting 
higher rates of indigenous participation in crime. 276 Recent studies 
examining indigenous disparity in sentencing confirm that legal variables 
including criminal antecedents, current crime seriousness, and breach of 
noncustodial sanctions are determinative, rather than racial profile.277 
Indeed, one study found that indigeneity was more likely to mitigate 
sentence severity in jurisdictions where the judiciary recognizes the 
destructive impact of colonialization upon traditional indigenous 
societies and the severe socio-economic disadvantage it continues to 
produce.278 
Nevertheless, the failure of the current sentencing regime to redress 
recidivism and mitigate the impact of unacceptably high rates of 
incarceration upon the indigenous community has led to experimentation 
with other approaches incorporating restorative justice elements. These 
are discussed infTa Part V. 
Judicial discretion in Australian sentencing is not completely 
unconstrained. All Australian jurisdictions have implemented sentencing 
legislation that specifies sentencing purposes and sets out relevant factors 
and principles that should be applied in the sentencing process. 279 
Identified purposes of sentencing include punishment, rehabilitation, 
general and specific deterrence, protection of the community, 
denunciation, and restoring relations between the victim, the community, 
275. STEERINGCOMM., supra note 266, at 8.7. 
276. Id at 8.10. 
277. Lucy Snowball & Don Weatherburn, Does Racial Bias in Sentencing Contribute to 
Indigenous Overrepresentation in Prison?, 40 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIM. 272, 286-87 (2007). 
278. Samantha Jeffries & Christine Bond, Does Indigeneity Matter? Sentencing 
Indigenous Offenders in South Australia's Higher Courts 42 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIM. 47, 64-65 
(2009). Not all Australian jurisdictions adopt this approach. Other jurisdictions have downplayed 
indigeneity as a ground for leniency, especially where the offender lives in a modern, urban 
environment. SeeR v. Fuller-Cust [2002] V.S.C.A. 168, paras. 58-63; R v. Ceissman (2001) 160 
F.L.R. 252, 257; Crawford v. Laverty (2008) A.C.T.S.C. 107, paras. 18-25. 
279. Crimes Act, 1914, pt. IB, div. 2 (Austl.); Crimes (Sentencing Act), 2005, pt. 4(1), 
§§ 33-34 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999, § 4 (N.S.W); Criminal 
Law (Sentencing) Act, 1988, § 2(10) (S. Austl.); Sentencing Act, 2008, Pt. 2 (N. Terr.); Penalties 
and Sentences Act, 1992, § 9 (Queens!.); Sentencing Act, 1997, § 3 (Tas.); Sentencing Act, 1995, 
§ 6 (W. Austl.); Sentencing Act, 1991, § 5 (Viet.). 
380 TULANE J OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 18 
and the offender. 280 Specified factors the courts are required to take into 
account include the nature and circumstances of the offence, the degree 
of the offender's criminality, the victim's circumstances, the level of harm 
inflicted, demonstrated remorse and/or provision of restitution, the 
offender's personal circumstances, and the impact of a sentence upon the 
offender's family or dependents.281 However, there is no ranking of the 
purposes or factors. Thus, no single approach to sentencing is practiced 
or prescribed, and judges are free to emphasize the purposes and factors 
they believe individual cases warrant. As explained in ~en v. The 
Queen (No. 2) 
[The sentencing purposes] are guideposts to the appropriate sentence but 
sometimes they point in different directions. And so a mental abnormality 
which makes an offender a danger to society when he is at large but which 
diminishes his moral culpability for a particular crime is a factor which has 
two countervailing effects: one which tends towards a longer custodial 
sentence, the other towards a shorter. 282 
The Australian approach has attracted critics voicing concerns similar to 
those opposed to indeterminate sentencing in the United States during 
the 1970s. Arguably, the lack of substantial constraint can lead to 
incoherence and produce unjustified disparities in sentencing.283 The 
absence of data and studies supporting options that best address 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and other mandated sentencing aims and 
objectives from sentencing hearings also exposes Australian sentencing 
practice to claims of lack of efficacy.284 This is exemplified by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission's report, Same Crime, Same 
Time,285 which, among other things, recommended the adoption of new 
federal sentencing legislation in the face of apparently unequal 
sentencing practices across Australian jurisdictions. 286 Even within 
280. See sources cited supra note 279. 
281. See sources cited supra note 279. 
282. (1988) 164 C.L.R. 465, 476-77; see also Markarian v. The Queen (2005) 228 C.L.R. 
357 (rejecting an atomistic, structured approach to sentencing and characterizing sentencing as a 
"complex alchemy"). 
283. See RICHARD EDNEY & MIRK.o BAGARIC, AuSTRALIAN SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE 15-16 (2007); John L. Anderson, 'Indefmite; Inhwnane, Inequitable'-The Pnnciple of 
Equal Application of the Law and the Natural Life Sentence for Murder: A Refbrrn Agenda., 29 
U. N.S.W L.J. 139, 139 (2006); ANDREW AsHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 331 
(4th ed. 2005). 
284. See Mirko Bagaric, Strategic (and Popular) Sentencing, 2 INT'L J. PuNISHMENT & 
SENT'G 121, 126 (2006). 
285. AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT No. 103, SAME CRIME, SAME TIME: 
SENTENCING OF fEDERAL OFFENDERS (2006). 
286. Id at 13. Interestingly, however, the legislation recommended by the Law Reform 
Commission largely replicates existing Australian state legislation. In other words, judicial 
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Australian jurisdictions, the recogrutlon of the potential for 
individualized justice to conflict with equality before the law has led to 
administrative, judicial, and legislative reforms in some jurisdictions and 
the call for reform in others.287 The reforms include the establishment of 
sentencing databases to record trends in the range of sentences applicable 
to particular offences,288 the creation of Sentencing Councils that act as 
advisory bodies to the courts and the Attorney General, 289 and the 
adoption of guideline judgments by appellate courts that set penalty 
tariffs for particular types of offences.29° Consistent with United States v. 
Booker,291 the latter are not binding,292 but in contrast to the United States, 
the sentencing guidelines are judicially, not legislatively, generated. 
Australian appellate courts have a greater capacity to review 
sentencing decisions and to develop sentencing guidelines compared 
with their U.S. counterparts, whose appellate sentencing jurisprudence 
has been described as "almost non-existent."293 This may be viewed as a 
partial justification for the rejection of indeterminate sentencing by U.S. 
policy makers and its continued appeal in Australia. Review at the 
behest of either the defendant or the prosecution, where both the justice 
discretion is left unfettered, although the Report purports to promote greater transparency of 
reasoning in the sentencing process. Cf. id at 541-42. 
287. See, e.g., EDNEY & BAGARIC, supra note 283, at 17; Bagaric, supra note 284. 
288. The utility of these databases is discussed further by N.S.W. Chief Justice J.J. 
Spigelman. J.J. Spigelman, N.S.W. Chief Justice, Consistency and Sentencing, Keynote Address 
to the Sentencing 2008 Conference of the National Judicial College of Australia (Feb. 8, 2008), 
available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.aullawlink/Supreme_ Courtlll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/spigelman 
080208.pdf/$file/Spigelman080208.pdf. 
289. See, e.g., Victoria Sentencing Advisory Council, Welcome to the Sentencing 
Advisory Council, http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2010); N.S.W. 
Sentencing Council, About Us, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/Lawlink/scounciUll_scouncil.nsf/ 
pages/scouncil_aboutus (last visited Jan. 6, 2010); N.S.W. Judicial Comm'n, Welcome to the 
Judicial Commission of New South Wales, http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/ (last visited Jan. 6, 
2010) (noting that the Commission is tasked with assisting the courts to achieve consistency in 
sentencing in New South Wales). 
290. Guideline judgments have been adopted in New South Wales and to a limited extent 
in South Australia. See Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999, pt. 3, div. 4 (N.S.W.); Criminal 
Law (Sentencing) Act, 1988, § 29A-2913 (S. Austl.). Victoria and Western Australia have also 
enacted legislation allowing for guideline judgments. See Sentencing Act, 1991, § 6AA (Viet.); 
Sentencing Act, 1995, § 143 (W. Austl.). However, Arie Freiberg and Peter Sallmann report that 
appellate courts in those states have regarded guideline judgments as unduly legalistic and 
contrary to the paradigm that sentencing is largely a matter of judicial discretion. Arie Freiberg & 
Peter Sallmann, Courts of Appeal and Sentencing: Principles, Policy and Politics, 26 L. IN 
CONTEXT 43, 56 (2008). 
291. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005); see supra text accompanying notes 224-225. 
292. Studies by the Judicial Commission of New South Wales confirm that the guideline 
judgments have been very effective in producing greater uniformity in sentencing. See 
Spigelman, supra note 288, at 18-19. 
293. Freiberg & Sallmann, supra note 290, at 56. 
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of the individual case and the public interest in ensuring that a just 
penalty is imposed can be addressed, allays the appearance of 
arbitrariness that individualized sentencing might otherwise evoke. This 
also provides Australian appellate courts with an opportunity to impart 
authoritative guidance to sentencing judges. 294 However, others are 
skeptical of appellate courts' ability to fashion sentencing standards, 
noting that appellate decision making is ad hoc, confined by the facts of 
the case and the arguments proffered by the parties, and itself subject to 
disparate views of the members of the bench regarding the importance of 
conflicting sentencing purposes and factors. 295 Moreover, despite the 
adoption of sentencing guidelines by some jurisdictions, it seems that 
Australian appellate courts remain deferential to the sentencing of trial 
judges and are unlikely to intervene except in egregious cases.296 Hence, 
while appellate review constitutes a potential forum for the development 
of sentencing policy, it may in fact be a weak mechanism for achieving 
coherence and consistency and therefore of itself cannot be characterized 
as a substantial explanation for the stark divergence in sentencing 
outcomes observed between Australia and the United States. 
One important feature of the maintenance of judicial discretion in 
sentencing is that it preserves a significant role for mercy. Subjective 
aspects of the offender's personal life become far more important when 
sentencing is the legal and moral responsibility of a judge facing the 
defendant in the courtroom. This, of course, is in contrast to having an 
anonymous and attenuated legislature that is accountable to a community 
whose outlook (in the absence of knowledge of the offender's particulars 
and the circumstances of the offending) will largely be skewed toward 
retribution.297 Not having judicial discretion in sentencing is likely to lead 
to harsher sentencing, because the focus of the sentencing judge is forced 
away from individualized considerations to more publicly oriented 
matters such as culpability, just desserts, and the protection of the 
community. 298 
294. Wong v. The Queen (2001) 207 C.L.R. 584, 10. 
295. Freiberg & Sallmann, supra note 290, at 49-50. 
296. See, e.g., Lowndes v. The Queen (1999) 195 C.L.R. 665, para. 15. For an outsider's 
perspective on Australian appellate courts' approach to sentencing appeals, see Grant Hammond, 
Sentencing: Intuitive Synthesis or Structured Discretion?, N.Z. L. REv. 211, 216 (2007). 
297. GELB, MORE MYTIIS, supra note 263, at 4-5 (fmding that in the abstract, public 
opinion was that sentencing was too lenient, but when provided with particular information about 
the crime, the offender, and the victim, the public becomes far less punitive). 
298. See, e.g., Matthew S. Crow & William Bales, Sentencing Guidelines and Focal 
Concems: The Effect of Sentencing Policy as a Practical Constraint on Sentencing Decisions, 30 
AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 285, 286 (2006) (fmding that while the introduction of determinate sentencing 
reduced disparity in sentencing linked to nonlegal variables such as the race of the offender, it 
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Mandatory sentences are not only designed to produce greater 
uniformity in sentencing outcomes; they are primarily designed to 
restrict perceived judicial trivialization of offences, narrowing sentencing 
options and increasing punitiveness. Mandatory sentencing rarely offers 
much more than longer terms of imprisonment and is almost myopic in 
promoting retribution and specific deterrence to the exclusion of other 
sentencing aims, such as rehabilitation and general deterrence. 299 
Customized, alternative forms of sentencing-for example, community 
service orders, compulsory medical treatment, reparation, restorative 
measures, home detention, and fines-seldom figure into mandatory 
sentencing regimes. On the other hand, the maintenance of judicial 
discretion in sentencing is more consistent with greater innovation in 
sentencing practice. The U.S. war on drugs is an example. Because of 
harsh sentences for drug offenders that, in some cases, rival sentences for 
serious violent crimes, 300 the courts and prisons have become 
overcrowded with drug users and low level drug distributors. 301 Yet, the 
market for drugs has flourished. Arguably, this has occurred because 
drug policies based upon public health and harm-reduction have been 
sidelined. 
However, the above observations still beg the question as to why the 
Australian polity retains judicial discretion, along with the less punitive 
forms of sentencing it generates, and why policy makers in the United 
States are seriously questioning whether mandatory sentencing and the 
punitive regimes they generate are cost-effective.302 Public opinion in 
Australia regarding sentencing is very similar to public opinion in the 
United States. Driven by sensational reporting in the media, the majority 
of the Australian public is under the impression that crime (especially 
significantly increased sentencing severity); Matthew S. Crow & Marc Gertz, Sentencing Policy 
and Disparity: Guidelines and the Influence of Legal and Democratic Subcultures, 36 J. CRIM. 
JusT. 362 (2008) (examining the effects of the reintroduction of judicial discretion and finding 
that nonlegal variables, such as gender and race, increased the likelihood of incarceration in a 
follow up study). 
299. See generally Neil Hutton, Institutional Mechanisms for Incorporating the Public, in 
PENAL POPULISM, SENTENCING COUNCILS AND SENTENCING POLICY 205 (Arie Freiberg & Karen 
Gelb eds., 2008). 
300. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N, GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2D 1.1, 1.2 (2009). 
30 I. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso et a!., The War on Drugs Is a Failure, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 23, 2009; seealsoDANBAUM, SMOKEANDMIRR.ORS: THEWARONDRUGSANDTHEPOLffiCS 
OF FAILURE, at xii (1996). 
302. See, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y. Gen., Address at the 2009 ABA Convention, 
available at http://www. usdoj .gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090803.html; PEw CENTER ON THE 
STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 3 (2008), available at http://www. 
pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/80 15PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-l-l_FORWEB.pdf. 
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violent crime) is escalating even when it is stable or decreasing.303 They 
also underestimate the harshness of existing sentencing practices and 
overestimate rates of recidivism.304 The public has little faith in the courts 
or the legal system and believes that sentencing judges are out of touch 
with community values. These views are reinforced by governments 
quick to claim that their punitive sentencing policies are linked to falling 
crime rates. As a result, the rhetoric of crime and justice is just as central 
in partisan politics in Australia as it appears to be in the United States.305 
Yet at the same time, mandatory sentencing regimes are not popular 
except for those covering a small range of violent crirnes.306 They have 
been condemned by Australia's Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Cornrnission307 and the Australian Law Reform Cornrnission.308 These 
regimes are lambasted as draconian when applied to low-level criminal 
activity,309 regarded as racially discriminatory in operation,310 and in the 
case of the Northern Territory government, which campaigned to 
maintain mandatory sentencing, a cause of electoral failure. 311 Australians 
prefer individualized sentencing in the hands of judges, even if they 
perceive that judges are generally too lenient. 
Australian courts also recognize that "money spent on increasing 
imprisonment is not necessarily well spent (even in comparison with 
303. Western Australia v. BLM (2009) 256 A.L.R. 129, para. 20 (citing DoN 
WEATHERBURN, N.S.W BUREAU OF STATISTICS & CRIME RESEARCH, PuBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF 
CRIME TRENDS IN NEW SOUTH WALES AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA (2004)); GELB, MORE MYTHS, 
supmnote263. 
304. BLM256 A.L.R. 129, para. 20. 
305. See Michael Tonry, Parochialism in US. Sentencing Policy, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 48, 
49 (1999). 
306. See Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion and MandiJtory Sentencing: A Review of 
Intemational Findings, 30 CRJM. JusT. & BEHAV. 483, 495-99 (2003). 
307. Austl. Human Rights Comm'n, Mandatory Detention Laws in Australia: An 
Overview of Current Laws and Proposed Reform, http://www.hreoc.gov.au!HUMAN_RlGHTS/ 
children/mandatory_briefmg.htrnl (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) (finding that mandatory regimes 
were contrary to Australia's international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and when applied to juvenile offenders were contrary to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child). 
308. AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supm note 285, at 540-42. 
309. Draconian examples include a fifteen-year-old boy who hanged himself while 
imprisoned for twenty-eight days for stealing stationary and breaking a window and the 
sentencing of a twenty-one-year-old Aboriginal man for one year for stealing biscuits and cordial. 
See Shame 2000, Bored, Unemployed, Indigenous and in Jail: Mandatory Sentencing in 
Australia, http://www.unolympics.com/humanrights/mandatory.shtrnl (last visited Jan. 7, 2010). 
310. AUSTL. SENATE LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES COMM., INQUIRY INTO THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS (MANDATORY SENTENCING OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS) BILL 1999, at 96 (2000). 
311. LAW SOC'Y N. TERR., THE DEMISE OF MANDATORY SENTENCING-A 5 YEAR SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENT 5 (2002), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committeellegcon_ctte/completed_ 
inquiries/2002-04/hra_mandset/submissions/sublist.htrn. 
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expenditure on rehabilitation, let alone in comparison with expenditure 
on matters such as policing or healthcare )."312 In 2007-2008, Australian 
state governments spent $2.6 billion on prisons compared with $0.3 
billion spent on community-based corrections.313 However, Australian 
law reform agencies have found no scientific evidence supporting a 
causal link between increasing the severity of sentencing and reduced 
crime rates.314 In fact, the rise of alternative restorative and therapeutic 
approaches in sentencing is consistent with a level of dissatisfaction with 
the efficacy of ever-increasing imprisonment rates and a search for a 
more judicious, evidence-based sentencing policy and practice. 
V. ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING 
A. Umted States 
"After decades of supercharged incarceration rates, our bloated 
prison system is straining under its own weight, and policy makers are 
finally being forced to deal with the need to shrink it."315 
As noted earlier, the United States currently appears to have the 
highest reported incarceration rate in the world.316 With the astronomical 
economic and social consequences of over-incarceration, pressure to 
resolve this problem has created a great demand for alternatives. For the 
first time in decades, a serious debate-fueled by tough economic 
realities and pushed by a small number of U.S. senators-is beginning to 
take place across the nation.317 Alternatives to incarceration are sought. 
312. Western Australia v. BLM (2009) 526A.L.R. 129, para. 20. 
313. STEERINGCOMM., supra note 266, at 8.3. 
314. See, e.g., TAS. LAW REFORM lNST., SENTENCING FINAL REPORT No. II, at 2.1.25-.30 
(2008). 
315. Charles M. Blow, Getting Smart on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A19. For a 
good overview of the developments here-focusing on the economic impetus-see Nicholas 
Riccardi, Cash-Strapped States Revise Laws To Get Inmates Out, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, 
available atwww.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-prison-release5-2009sep05,0,57053 
09.story. 
316. See supra Part IY. 
317. The chief proponent is Senator James Webb of Virginia, who has aggressively 
promoted a broad debate on the topic. See Jeff E. Schapiro, Utebb States Case for Pnson RefOI111, 
NEws & ADVANCE (Va.), Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.newsadvance.com/lna/news/state_regionall 
article/webb_sates_case_for_prison_reform/15231; Reviewing Criminal Justice, supra note 226; 
Editorial, Utebb Takes on Politics' Third Rail Prison Refoi111, NEWS & ADVANCE (Va.), Mar. 29, 
2009, http://www.newsadvance.com/lnalnews/opinion/editorials/article!webb_takes_on_politics_ 
third_rail_prison_reform/14713/. Many states, however, have already instituted numerous 
changes in response to dire economic situations. See Keith B. Richburg, States Seek Less Costly 
Substitutes for Prison, WASH. POST, July 13, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynlcontent/article/2009/17/12/AR2009071202432.html ("[M]ore than half the states and the 
District [of Columbia] are trying to reduce the growth in their prison populations through 
alternative sentencing and through new probation and parole procedures."). 
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We focus inffa Part VAl on the development in the United States of one 
of the earliest, and most widespread, alternatives: the drug court. Other 
options clearly are present. Still, with an apparent consensus that the 
current state of incarceration in the United States is problematic, 
viewpoints significantly differ more in the United States than in Australia 
on what should be done to correct that problem. The drug courts, though, 
are widely heralded.318 
1. Drug Courts 
National and state drug policy, supporting longer sentences and 
mandatory minimums for drug offenders as a part of the "war on drugs," 
created a huge influx of inmates:319 80% of adults incarcerated for 
felonies were arrested on drug offenses, were under the influence of 
drugs at the time of their offense, committed a crime to support a drug 
habit, and/or were regular drug or alcohol users at arrese20 Unfortunately, 
incarceration has proved to do little to solve the problem of substance 
abuse for offenders. Nearly 70% of drug abusing offenders are 
rearrested within three years following release, with 41% being 
rearrested. on a drug offense in particular.321 Increasingly, critics assert 
that substantial prison sentences represent the most expensive and least 
successful response to drug crimes with a cost that is incredibly high. 322 
Due to the significant effect of drugs and substance abuse on the penal 
318. One important development occurring in recent years concerns pretrial diversion 
programs. This area is not included for discussion here, as it is an alternative to prosecution, 
rather than an alternative to traditional sentencing options. These programs "divert certain 
offenders from traditional criminal justice processing into a program of supervision and services." 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATToRNEY'S MANuAL § 9-22.0 I 0, available at http://www. 
justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/22mcrm.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 201 0). 
For an interesting state program, see Georgia's version, detailed inS. 412, 1999-2000 Sess. (Ga. 
2000). 
319. See Mae C. Quinn, J.Wiose Team Am I on Anyw.~y? Musings of a Public Defender 
About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37, 41-42 (2000) 
(discussing the "War on Drugs" policies and their impact on the criminal justice system). 
320. Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REv. 717, 720 
(2008). 
321. Id at 721. 
322. Id ("The U.S. government is now spending upwards of$12.9 billion per year on illicit 
drug control, including police protection, the judiciary, corrections, and related costs. In 2003, 
alcohol and other drugs were responsible for roughly 628,000 emergency room visits in the 
United States. Moreover, the total impact on society of alcohol and other drug use is estimated to 
have cost the United States in excess of $180 billion in 2002, a 5.34% increase over the prior 
decade. Using U.S. Census data, this figure represents a burden of$642 for every resident of the 
country during 2002." (footnotes omitted)). 
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system, it is no surprise that this area has become a focal point for 
creating options other than incarceration. 323 
Drug courts represent the most significant alternative to the 
incarceration problem specifically keyed to the needs of drug abusing 
offenders. The drug court is a nonadversarial, therapeutic adjudication 
alternative to the traditional criminal justice system. Instead of working 
in opposition to one another, the prosecutor, defense, and judge are asked 
to collaborate in addressing the specific needs of the offender in 
treatment. Typically, there are three paths to the drug court: (1) as a 
condition of an agreement for diversion of prosecution, (2) as a condition 
to a guilty plea, or (3) as a sentencing deferral for a verdict. Participation 
in the drug court treatment programs is not mandatory for drug violation 
defendants but is strongly encouraged, and breaking conditions of such 
programs usually results in the imposition of significant consequences.324 
Jurisdictions impose a variety of eligibility requirements for drug court 
programs, and such treatment programs last a year or more; treatment 
services are predominantly outpatient. Two key components that are 
characteristic of the more than 2000 U.S. drug courts are (1) the use of 
short jail terms for court participants who do not comply with the 
requirements of the program, and (2) frequent court appearances before 
the same judge to monitor treatment progress.325 
The first drug court was established in Florida twenty years ago.326 
The federal government has contributed to the funding of these drug 
courts, further encouraging growth. The 2009 Omnibus Appropriations 
Act allocated $40 million for funding of drug court programs and $1.25 
million for funding of the National Drug Court Institute.327 Additionally, 
legislatures in forty-nine states have supported the growth of drug courts 
providing funding and statutory guidelines.328 With this support, and the 
ever pressing need to find a fix for overcrowding in the penitentiary 
system, the drug court movement has accelerated rapidly. 
The drug court movement has fueled strong support and vehement 
opposition on both ideological and practical levels. Supporters argue that 
323. For a good overview, see Richburg, supra note 317. 
324. See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 320, at 746. The National Association of Drug Court 
Professionals (NADCP) publishes an excellent set of materials describing the process. See 
generally Nat'! Drug Court Inst., Publications, http://www.ndci.org/publications (last visited Jan. 
7, 2010) (linking to NADCP publications). 
325. SeeHora & Stalcup, supra note 320, at 762-63. 
326. Jd at 766. 
327. H.R. 1105, !11th Cong. (2009), avaJlable at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=lll_cong_bills&docid=f:hll05enr.txt.pdf. 
328. See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 320, at 766. 
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drug courts are ideologically a more rational, effective, and ethical way to 
deal with drug addicted offenders, by providing treatment for the 
recognized disease of addiction.329 On a practical level, supporters claim 
that drug courts reduce recidivism, lower costs associated with 
incarceration, and address the root problem of substance abuse behind 
drug crimes.330 In terms of repeat offenders, some evidence indicates that 
drug court treatment programs successfully lower recidivism rates.331 The 
National Association of Drug Court Professionals is an especially 
effective supporter. Its views are striking: 
FACT: Nationwide, for every $1.00 invested in Drug Court, taxpayers 
save as much as $3.36 in avoided criminal justice costs alone. 
FACT: When considering other cost offsets such as savings from 
reduced victimization and healthcare service utilization, studies 
have shown benefits range up to $12 for every $1 invested. 
FACT: Drug Courts produce cost savings ranging from $4,000 to 
$12,000 per client. Th~se cost savings reflect reduced prison 
costs, reduced revolving-door arrests and trials, and reduced 
victimization. 
FACT: In 2007, for every Federal dollar invested in Drug Court, $9.00 
was leveraged in state funding. 
FACT: 
FACT: 
FACT: 
For methamphetamine-addicted people, Drug Courts increase 
treatment program graduation rates by nearly 80%. 
When compared to eight other programs, Drug Courts 
quadrupled the length of abstinence from methamphetamine. 
Drug Courts reduce methamphetamine use by more than 50% 
d . 1 332 compare to outpatient treatment a one. 
329. See, e.g., id at 745-46. 
330. See 1d at 791. 
331. Id; see also Douglas B. Marlowe et al., A Sober Assessment of Drug Courts, 16 FED. 
SENT'G REP. 153, !54 (2003) (stating that in surveying fifteen unpublished studies on drug court 
statistics, drug court participants were foimd to have lowered rates of criminal recidivism, drug 
use, and unemployment than those with prison time, intermediate sanctions, or probation, and 
these rates were reduced by 20 to 30% for participants during the program, and I 0 to 20% 
following conclusion of treatment). 
332. Nat'! Ass'n of Drug Court Policy (NADCP), Drug Courts Work, http://www.nadcp. 
org/leam/drug-courts-work (last visited Jan. 7, 2010); see also Nat'! Drug Court Inst., Court 
Facts, http://www.ndci.org/courtfacts_benefits.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2010). Other commenta-
tors are more restrained: 
The not-so-simple fact is that drug courts are neither successful nor unsuccessful. 
They "work" for some clients under some circumstances but are ineffective or 
contraindicated for others. They can be administered poorly and inefficiently and, 
unfortunately, we do not know enough to identifY specific errors in implementation. 
If drug courts were required to undergo the same type of approval process as 
new medications, they would probably be labeled as "experimental" and might not be 
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Despite some documented advantages over incarceration, drug court 
opponents question the validity and methods of studies indicating that 
drug courts have a statistically significant reduction in recidivism.333 
Even if the reduced recidivism rates are accurate, some critics of drug 
courts argue that while treatment of offenders in the program may have 
higher rates of success, the programs actually trigger "massive net-
widening" by including offenders who would not otherwise be incarcera-
ted. 334 They also attack the courts on rights-based and ideological 
grounds. One of the most common criticisms here is that the 
collaborative drug court system erodes the adversarial system, impacting 
the rights of defendants and weakening the ability of defense counsel to 
ethically represent defendants. 335 
Other prominent rights-based and ideological attacks of drug courts 
are focused on the coercive nature of the court, and the impact of faith-
based organizations in treatment of offenders. Opponents of drug courts 
contend that offenders are not provided with any real option of accepting 
treatment when the only alternative is incarceration. 336 Still, such 
critiques have not at all slowed the growth rate of, and enthusiasm for, the 
drug court option. 
approved for specific uses. This is because we do not yet understand their mechanism 
of action, do not know their contraindications, and do not know their appropriate 
dosage. On the other hand, to take the analogy a step further, there is ample scientific 
support for drug courts to warrant further research on them, and to make them 
available to desperate clients who have not responded favorably to currently available 
treatments. 
Marlowe, supra note 331, at 156. But see ROBERT BARNOSKI & STEVE Aos, WASH. STATE INST. 
FOR PuB. POLICY, WASHINGTON STATE'S DRUG COURTS FOR ADULT DEFENDANTS: OUTCOME 
EVALUATION AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS I (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ 
rptfiles/drugcourtMar2003.pdf ("[D]rug courts generate $1.74 in benefits for each dollar of costs. 
Thus, adult drug courts appear to be cost-effective .... "). The latest research appears to bear out 
many of the pro-court claims. In the Supreme Court of Virginia's Program Evaluation of 
Virginia's Drug Treatment Courts, the authors found that the rearrest rate for drug court 
participants was significantly lower than for nonparticipants. SUPREME COURT OF VA., PROGRA.!'vl 
EVALUATION OF VIRGINIA'S DRUG TREATMENT COURTS 2008 REPORT 43-44 (2009). And, that was 
not the only positive result found in the state's twenty-nine drug courts. Other evidence of 
progress is shown as to "improved employment, education, and health gains." ld at 2. 
333. See Morris B. Hoffinan, The Rehabilitative Ideal and the Drug Court Reality, !4 FED. 
SENT'GREP. 172,172 (2001). 
334. See id at 174. This complaint is, as we shall see, also heard in Australia. 
335. Id at 175; see also Tamar M. Meekins, "Specialized Justice':· The Over-Emergence 
of Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 
I, 3 (2006); Quinn, supra note 319, at 74. 
336. Hora & Stalcup, supra note 320, at 750. 
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2. Other Alternative Courts 
Additional therapeutic jurisprudence specialty courts are spreading 
around the United States, following the drug court framework. Over 
2500 such problem-solving courts, in more than a dozen different 
substantive areas, can be found across the nation.337 These include: 
mental health courts,338 domestic violence courts,339 community courts,340 
homeless courts, 341 criminal mediation projects, 342 prisoner reentry 
courts, 343 veteran's criminal courts, 344 DUI/DWI courts, 345 and college 
student restorative justice courts.346 
Some in the United States also argue forcefully for alternatives that 
look to different sorts of punishment, such as shaming.347 While, as we 
shall see, the Australians have been somewhat more willing to look to 
other approaches, the Americans have seemingly united-at least at this 
time-mainly on the drug court option as discussed above. 
337. John A. Bozza, Benevolent Behavior Modification: Understanding the Nature and 
Limitations of Problem-Solving Courts, 17 WIDENER L.J. 97, 98 (2007) (citing C. West 
Huddleston III et al., Painting the Current Picture: A National RepoJt Card on Drug Courts and 
Other Problem Solving Court Programs in the United States, NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REv., May 
2005, at 10-14). For a good overview of such courts, see PAUL HIGGINS & MICHELL B. 
MACKINEM, PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? (2009). 
338. See generally LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health 
Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Ofli:nders, 28 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 255 (2001); Andrea M. Odegaard, Note, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Impact of 
Mental Health Courts on the Criminal Justice System, 83 N.D. L. REv. 225, 245 (2007); Susan 
Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PuB. PoL'Y & L. 
507 (2005). 
339. See Julia Weber, Domestic Violence Courts: Components and Considerations, 2 J. 
CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTs. 23, 23-24 (2000). 
340. See Meekins, supra note 335, at 24. 
341. Id at 26. First created in San Diego, California, in 1989, the homeless court was 
formed as a means of clearing warrants existing for homeless people already involved in shelter 
treatment programs. Jd Program advocates broker plea agreements in exchange for the accused 
being sentenced to continue the treatment program. Id 
342. Birgit Larsson, Mediation in Criminal Matters Project Flourishes in Kings County, 
New JVrk; A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. NEWSL. (A.B.A. Criminal Justice Section, Wash., D.C.), 
Spring 2009, at 4. 
343. Jd 
344. See Nicholas Riccardi, Courts Give l*lyw.ud Veterans a Chance, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
10, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/Mar/1 0/nation/na_ veterans_courtl 0. 
345. Victor E. Flango, Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, DWI Courts: The Newest Problem-
Solving Courts, in FlffURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 84, 84 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2004), 
availableathttp://www.ncsconline.org!WC/Publications!KIS_CtFutu_Trends04.pdf. 
346. See Sara Lipka, With 'Restorative Justice,' Colleges Strive To Educate Student 
Ofli:nders, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Apr. 17, 2009, at A26, available athttp://chronicle.com/article/ 
With-Restorative-Justice-130551. 
347. Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments BeautifUlly Retnbutive? Retributivism and 
Implications for the Altemative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2157, 2162-63 (200 1 ). 
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B. Australia 
1. Introduction 
Heavily influenced by innovations in sentencing practices in the 
United States, Australian courts have also been involved in a wave of 
experimentation over the last ten years as incarceration rates and 
expenses have increased along with community expectations for a more 
responsive and cost-effective criminal justice system. As in the United 
States, specialty courts have developed with the aim of diverting 
offenders from jail and delivering more therapeutic or restorative justice 
that is oriented to resolving the problems underlying criminal behavior. 
In Australia, however, it is not only the drug court that has gained 
widespread approval. 
2. Australian Drug Courts 
As noted earlier, drug courts in the United States have arisen as a 
reaction to the severity of the war on drugs. Australian drug courts, in 
contrast, emerged unaccompanied by harsh mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug possession and use. Nonetheless, the impetus for the 
establishment of drug courts in Australia was similar, driven by 
community concern over increasing rates of property and violent crime 
and their perceived link with drug trafficking and drug use.348 However, 
unlike the United States, where the legislature's response to community 
apprehension was to impose draconian penalties, the Australian response 
reflected the realization that imprisonment was an ineffective instrument 
to address drug related offending.349 Drug courts appealed because they 
adopted a therapeutic approach to the problem of drug dependency, 
required offenders to take personal responsibility for their offending and 
rehabilitation, and appeared to reduce drug related crime at a much lower 
cost than imprisonmeneso 
348. Joy WUNDERSITZ, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSES TO 
DRUG AND DRUG-RELATED OFFENDING: ARE THEY WORKING? 2 (2007). 
349. See David Indermaur & Lynne Roberts, Drug Courts in Australia: The First 
Generation, 15 CURRENT IssuEs IN CRIM. JusT. 136, 137 (2003) [hereinafter Indermaur & 
Roberts, Drog Court5]; Lynne Roberts & David Indermaur, Timely Intervention or Trapping 
Minnows? The Potential fiJr a Range of Net- WJdening Efkcts in Australian Drug Diversion 
Initiatives, 13 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 220, 220 (2006) [hereinafter Roberts & Indermaur, 
Timely Intervention]. 
350. Indermaur & Roberts, Drog Court5, supra note 349, at 137; see also Melissa Bull, A 
Comparative Review of Best Practice Guidelines for the Diversion of Drog Related 0/knders, 16 
INT'L J. DRUG POL'Y 223, 223 (2005); Frances O'Callaghan et a!., Drog and Crime Cycle: 
Evaluating Traditional Methods ~rsus Diversion Strategies /Or Drug-Related 0/knces, 39 
AUSTL. PSYCHOLOGIST 188, 190-91 (2004). 
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Whereas drug courts in the United States were developed 
principally at the grass roots level, in Australia a nationally coordinated 
approach was adopted, underpinned by significant fiscal support. 
Between 1999 and 2008, the federal government devoted AUS$340 
million to drug diversion programs supplemented by substantial state-
based funding of drug courts.351 The injection of funding, together with 
the development of a national framework known as the Illicit Drug 
Diversion Initiative (IDDI), agreed to by all Australian state governments, 
facilitated the rapid rollout of a range of drug diversion programs across 
Australian jurisdictions.352 Although Australian drug courts were also 
largely local initiatives, they sit within and receive considerable support 
from the national strategy. They operate across the criminal process and 
health services spectrum at the prearrest, postarrest, presentencing, 
postsentencing, and prerelease stages involving police, corrections 
workers, government departments, government service providers, health 
practitioners, and social workers working in conjunction with the 
judiciary.353 New South Wales established the first drug court in 1999,354 
and by 2006 there were thirty-two IDDI-funded diversion police and 
court programs, operating in each Australian state and territory. 355 There 
are also approximately twenty-one non-IDDI funded programs.356 
In a number of jurisdictions, the practices of the drug courts are 
codified by legislation. This is in contrast with the United States, where 
practices of drug courts are generally unconstrained by regulation. For 
example, the Drug Court Act, 1998 (N.S.W), determines the eligibility 
of offenders for diversion to the drug court; empowers the court to 
commit the offender to a period of detention for the purpose of 
detoxification, assessment, and treatment; gives the court authority to 
impose compulsory treatment orders and other conditions of 
participation in the program; lays down procedures for noncompliance; 
351. Wundersitz, supra note 348, at 2. 
352. Bull, supra note 350, at 223. 
353. Catherine Spooner eta!., An Overview of Diversion Strategies for Australian Drug-
Related Offenders, 20 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 281, 281-82 (200 1 ). 
354. Ruth Lawrence & Karen Freeman, Design and Implementation of Australia's First 
Drug Court, 35 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 63, 63 (2002). 
355. AUSTL. INST. OF HEALTH & WELFARE, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ILLICIT DRUG 
DIVERSION INITIATIVE IN RURAL AND REMOTE AUSTRALIA 44 (2008), available at http://www.aihw. 
gov.au/publications/index.cfin/title/1 0496. 
356. CAITLIN HUGHES & ALLISON RITTER, AUSTL. NAT'L DRUG & ALCOHOL RESEARCH 
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and also regulates the Drug Court's procedure.357 Other similar state-
based legislation includes: (1) Drug Rehabilitation (Court Diversion) 
Act, 2000 (Queensl.); (2) Sentencing Act, 1991, sections 18Q-18ZS 
(Viet.); (3) Sentencing Act, 1995, sections 33A-33Q (W Austl.); and 
(4) Sentencing Act, 1997, sections 27A-27Y (Tas.). The legislation in 
each jurisdiction operates to target defendants with substance abuse 
problems who are brought before the courts on a wide range of matters. 
It then diverts them to a specialized court or requires the offenders to 
undertake a form of coerced treatment for their substance abuse problem 
over a substantial period of time (on average about three to four months' 
duration), subject to ongoing monitoring and review.358 The majority of 
the programs operate at the pre-sentence stage, although the Queensland 
legislation also refers to postsentence options.359 Defendants charged 
with sex offences or offences of serious violence are excluded from the 
drug diversion programs.360 If the defendants successfully complete the 
program it may lead to the withdrawal of charges against them, but 
typically program participation results in a reduced sentence.361 
There is some concern that Australia's formalization of drug 
diversion may counterintuitively widen the net of individuals subject to 
the criminal justice process.362 While previously lower-level offending, 
such as the possession of small amounts of drugs, may have attracted 
little or no intervention, once an intervention program is formalized it has 
been suggested that a greater number of individuals will therefore be 
corralled into the criminal justice system. 363 For example, South 
Australia introduced expiation notices for cannabis possession instead of 
criminal prosecution, which could result in a potential sentence of 
irnprisonmene64 Expiation notices then increased three-fold, as did the 
number of individuals with a criminal conviction for possession of 
cannabis because the police found the expiation notices easier to 
administer.365 Once caught by the criminal justice system, individuals 
charged with drug offences may have a strong incentive to plead guilty to 
357. SeeDrugCourtAct, 1998(N.S.W). 
358. Katie Willis & Jennifer Ahmad, Jntennediate Court-Based Diversion in Australia, 
CRJM. JusT. BULL., Apr. 2009, at 1, 4, available at http://ncpic.org.au/assets/downloads/ncpic/ 
publications/aic_bulletins/intermediate-court-based-diversion-in-australia.pdf. 
359. Jd 
360. Jd at3. 
361. Jd at4. 
362. See Roberts & Indermaur, Timely Intervention, supra note 349, at 220; O'Callaghan 
eta!., supra note 350, at 192. 
363. SeeO'Callaghan eta!., supra note 350, at 192. 
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365. Jd 
394 TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 18 
qualify for the diversion program and therefore avoid the possibility of a 
long term of imprisonment. As a result, the programs may attract 
infrequent drug users instead of the seriously addicted that the programs 
were intended to assist, although evidence that Australian drug courts are 
clogged with recreational drug users is scant. 
There have been a series of evaluations undertaken of Australian 
drug court regimes,366 but many are compromised because of a lack of 
comparison groups, small sample sizes, and short term follow up. As a 
result of high attrition rates, all suffer from reporting bias. Bearing these 
caveats in mind, the research has found that the diversion programs 
reduce drug use and criminal behavior and improve offenders' health and 
well-being. In terms of costs incurred, drug courts are not necessarily 
cheaper than conventional criminal justice processes, especially where 
participation in the diversion program requires the offender to undergo 
custodial assessment and treatmenC67 However, when reoffending is 
factored in, drug courts are much more cost-effective than incarcera-
tion.368 A study conducted by the Western Australia Attorney General's 
department has estimated cost savings of$67,345 per drug court clienC69 
Notwithstanding the demonstrated benefits of a nationally 
coordinated and well funded strategy, there is evidence that barriers to 
access have undermined the program's success, particularly among 
indigenous Australians. Although the Australian government has 
committed itself to closing the gap between indigenous and nonindige-
nous Australians,370 on all social and economic indicators, indigenous 
Australians are severely disadvantaged. 371 As noted earlier in this Article, 
incarceration rates are approximately thirteen times higher in the 
indigenous population. At the same time, substance abuse among 
indigenous offenders is alarmingly high. Over 68% of indigenous 
detainees in police custody test positive to a range of drugs, and there are 
366. Most of these are summarized in Wundersitz, supra note 348, at 2. See also HUGHES 
& RIITER, supra note 356, at 2; Don Weatherburn et a!., The NSW Drug Court: A Re-Evaluation 
of Its Effectiveness, CONTEMP. IssUES IN CRIME & JUST., Sept. 2008, at 1, 4; Marian Shanahan et 
a!., Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of the New South Wales Adult Drug Court Program, 28 
EVALUATION REv. 3, 4 (2004). 
367. Wundersitz, supra note 348, at 110. 
368. Jd 
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32 (2006), available at http:/ /www.courts.dotag. wa.gov.aul=files/Drug_court_review _2006.pdf. 
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inclusion.gov.au/Initiatives/Pages/closingthegap.aspx (last visited Jan. 8, 2010). 
371. STEERING COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF Gov'T SERV. PROVISION, PRODUCfiVITY 
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indications that alcohol abuse is associated with up to 90% of indigenous 
contacts with the criminal justice system.372 Many indigenous offenders 
also suffer from a coexisting mental illness.373 Diversion of indigenous 
offenders with substance abuse problems to assessment, education, and 
treatment would clearly be of great benefit to the offenders, their families, 
and their communities. Unfortunately, the IDDI framework excludes 
offenders who commit violent offences or those whose primary drug 
problem is an alcohol problem.374 The requirement that the offenders 
admit their guilt also operates as a barrier, since many indigenous people 
are reluctant to engage with the police or the criminal justice system.375 
Insofar as the indigenous population is concerned, obviously current 
sentencing policy and practice is failing. Eligibility criteria need to be 
changed, tailored indigenous health services need to be incorporated into 
the drug diversion programs, and the treatments they offer need to be 
made more inclusive of indigenous communities and indigenous 
culture.376 
3. Indigenous Courts 
The establishment of indigenous sentencing courts in some 
Australian jurisdictions has been another method to address overrepre-
sentation of indigenous offenders in the criminal justice system. 377 
Consistent with the philosophy of equality before the law, the indigenous 
courts apply the same sentencing principles to indigenous persons that 
would apply to nonindigenous persons. 378 However, the indigenous 
courts adopt procedures that aim to make criminal justice processes more 
culturally appropriate, to establish better communication and trust 
between the indigenous community and the judiciary, and to facilitate 
better understanding of offenders' life stories and situations through a 
process of exchange informed by senior members of the indigenous 
372. NAT'L INDIGENOUS DRUG & ALcOHOL COMM., AUSTL. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DRUGS, 
BRIDGES AND BARRIERS: ADDRESSING INDIGENOUS INCARCERATION AND HEALTH 5-6 (2008), 
http://www.nidac.org.au/publications/pdf/nidac_bridges_and_barriers.pdf. 
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377. MiCHAEL KING ET AL., NON-AoVERSARIAL JUSTICE 178 (2009); EDNEY & BAGARIC, 
supra note 283, at 8.10; Elena Marchetti & Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Courts and Justice 
Practices in Australia, TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CRIME & CR!M. JUST., May 2004, at 1, 1; Elena 
Marchetti & Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Sentencing Courts: Towards a Theoretical and 
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community.379 While the courts incorporate elements of therapeutic and 
restorative justice, they have been characterized as sui generis because 
their hallmark is involvement of the local indigenous community.380 
The first indigenous court was established at Port Adelaide in South 
Australia in 1999.381 There are now indigenous courts operating in each 
Australian jurisdiction except Tasmania. 382 Some are governed by 
specific legislation or regulation, for example, Criminal Procedure 
Regulation, Part 5 (N.S.W); Penalties and Sentences Act, 1992, § 195B 
(Queensl.); and Magistrates' Court (Koori Court) Act, 2002 (Viet.), while 
others have developed indigenous sentencing practices within existing 
sentencing law. 383 
Like the drug courts, evaluation of Australian indigenous courts is 
generally positive.384 Indigenous courts have assisted offenders to .take 
more responsibility for their offending and increased their awareness of 
the impact of their offending on victims and among the community. 
Unfortunately, however, because of the collaborative nature of the 
processes adopted by indigenous courts, like the IDDI framework, 
eligibility criteria exclude violent and sexual offenders, and so access to 
more culturally appropriate treatment is limited for many indigenous 
offenders. Consequently, the impact of indigenous courts upon 
reoffending has been mixed, with one study finding that direct 
involvement of the indigenous community in sentencing made no 
difference to indigenous recidivism absent other interventions such as 
drug treatment, cognitive behavioral therapy, or remedial education.385 
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Our initial thesis is that the divergence between the criminal justice 
systems of the United States and Australia can be explained as a 
difference between a rights-oriented culture and an official-centric 
culture. This notion can be easily applied to double jeopardy, as 
protection from double jeopardy clearly sits under the mantle of due 
379. Id 
380. Id 
381. Id at 417-18 tbl.l. 
382. Id 
383. Id 
384. Bridget McAsey, A Cntical Evaluation of the Koori Court Division of the Victorian 
Magistrates' Court, 10 DEAKIN L. REv. 654, 657 (2005); see also Ivan Potas et a!., Circle 
Sentencing in New South Wales: A Review and Evaluation, 8 AUSTL.lNDIGENOUS L. REP. 73, 80 
(2004); NATALIE PARKER & MARK PATHE, QUEENSL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & Arr'Y GEN., REPORT ON 
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process386 and, at an international level, comprises a long-established and 
commonly recognized civil righe87 In the United States, where the 
protection of the individual from an overbearing government is 
embedded within both popular and legal culture, protection from double 
jeopardy is an inviolable right that cannot be qualified or negated by 
legislation or government action. 388 Conversely, while at common law the 
Australian High Court has extended double jeopardy beyond the ancient 
doctrines of autrefois acquit! convict to embrace the broader concept of 
abuse of process,389 this development has been effectively negated. We 
refer here to a number of Australian state jurisdictions implementing 
laws that allow the retrial of acquittals or the trial of further offences that 
call earlier acquittals into doubt when fresh and compelling evidence of 
guilt is adduced. These laws were enacted largely because Australians do 
not believe that rights should trump the conviction and punishment of the 
guilty.390 
When applied to divergences between plea bargaining practice and, 
more importantly, completely distinct approaches to sentencing, our 
thesis requires further refinement. As noted above, charge bargaining in 
Australia is more limited than the plea bargaining that occurs in the 
United States. Although it occurs frequently, Australian charge 
bargaining is confined to negotiations over the number and seriousness 
of charges that will be prosecuted, and under nationally uniform 
guidelines that attempt to reflect the actual nature and extent of the 
defendant's criminality. Australian sentencing judges do not participate 
in, and are not bound by, agreements reached between defense counsel 
and prosecutors regarding any recommended sentence. 391 Given the 
comparatively limited nature of charge bargaining in Australia, it is 
therefore surprising that the major policy concern is the fear that 
negotiations between prosecution and defense will lead to unjustified 
horse trading, thus undermining the rule of law.392 State-based Australian 
legislative attempts to rein in charge bargaining are not initiated to 
386. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
387. SeeThe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 14, opened 
for signature Dec. 16, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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protect the rights of defendants. They are largely designed to ensure that 
defendants receive their just desserts.393 
In the United States, where plea bargaining is less constrained, the 
concern is different. Here, critics look to the coercive impact that an 
offer made by an overzealous prosecutor may have upon hapless 
defendants otherwise faced with an extraordinarily harsh sentence. 394 The 
unease regarding coercive plea bargaining in the United States is closely 
allied to high levels of punitiveness within U.S. mandatory sentencing 
frameworks. One of the observed collateral effects of adopting tough 
mandatory sentencing regimes in the United States has been a significant 
increase in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as to whether 
mandatory-sentencing-eligible charges will be pursued.395 
As we discussed above, in Australia, the community is playing a 
greater role in sentencing and, as a result, sentences are becoming more 
punitive. Still, sentencing remains largely within the province of the trial 
judge's discretion, allowing individualized mercy to be exercised where 
appropriate. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Australian judges are highly 
insulated from the consequences of sentencing decisions. Australian 
judges are appointed until retirement age, and cannot be removed except 
by way of an onerous parliamentary process.396 Typically, gross moral 
turpitude rather than unpopular decision making must be established to 
force an Australian judge from the bench. 397 By contrast, at the lower and 
intermediate levels of the state judiciary, where most sentencing occurs 
in the United States, many judges are compelled to seek re-election to 
remain in office.398 Studies confirm that sentences increase as judicial 
election/reelection nears, in response to the tendency of voters in U.S. 
393. SeeMiralis, supra note 87. 
394. See generally Richard Klein, Due Process Denied· Judicial Coercion in the Plea 
Bargaining Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1349 (2004); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as 
Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargain Re!Onn, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67 (2005); Douglas A. 
Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 949 (1986). 
395. See Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory 
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judicial electorates to be more mindful of instances of underpunishment 
than overly harsh sentencing.399 
As a result of mandatory sentencing regimes and sentencing 
guidelines, U.S. judges are less able to incorporate individualized mercy 
in their sentencing. These regimes were designed to ensure consistency 
in sentencing and thus supported the principle of equality before the 
law.400 In a second wave of reform during the 1980s and 1990s, along 
with the enactment of such measures as "three-strikes laws," the regimes 
became a vehicle to increase the use of imprisonment and the severity of 
prison sentences.401 
The retention of judicial discretion in Australian sentencing and the 
concomitant disparity in sentencing that it produces has been criticized 
for undermining equality before the law. 402 Nevertheless, limited 
attempts to introduce mandatory sentencing have had to be withdrawn 
following community outcry over its harsh and discriminatory impact.403 
While the Australian public, like the U.S. public, believes that sentences 
are generally too lenient, they perceive mandatory sentencing as unjust04 
and contrary to the realization that criminal behavior is often associated 
with victimization of the offender, 405 disability, 406 or significant 
disadvantage. 407 The retention of judicial discretion enables the 
sentencing judge to take account of the offender's personal situation and 
the circumstances of the offending, encourages guilty pleas to 
appropriate charges, and enables a creative and customized sentence 
more likely to incorporate therapeutic or restorative elements. 
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The popularity of noncustodial forms of sentencing in Australia also 
demonstrates the realization that overdependence on custodial sentencing 
is not cost-effective. On the whole, Australian legislatures and govern-
ments are of the view that high levels of imprisonment lead to 
unnecessary public expenditure through increased trial rates and longer 
case processing,408 and also place a significant financial strain on limited 
state budgets. Moreover, despite public "tough on crime" rhetoric as in 
the United States, they are also aware that harsh sentencing has a 
negligible impact on crime rates. 409 American policy makers are 
increasingly beginning to share these views as the cost and social impact 
of high levels of incarceration demonstrate that harsh mandatory 
sentencing regimes may not be sustainable, especially in tough economic 
times. 
The greater degree of prosecutorial discretion and the imposition of 
mandatory minimum sentences in the United States may reflect distrust 
and disempowerment of the judiciary.410 To that extent, the differences 
between the features of each criminal justice regime examined in this 
Article are consistent with the thesis that the Australian criminal justice 
system is more official-centric. By retaining their faith in the judiciary 
as best placed to exercise sentencing power (albeit while demanding 
greater participation in the sentencing process), Australians continue to 
exhibit the confidence in state-based institutions that we outlined in our 
earlier article. This does not involve eschewing rights-based 
jurisprudence focused upon the protection of the individual from an 
overbearing state. Still, it exhibits a continued belief in the need to 
preserve an independent judiciary free from executive constraint and 
shielded from populism.4'' By contrast, the limits placed on judicial 
sentencing discretion in the United States appears to reflect a penal 
policy aimed at capturing common public opinion and prioritizing it in 
sentence determination.412 
However, the thesis should not be strained too far. There are other 
differentiating sociological and political factors in each jurisdiction that 
408. Cf.TONRY, supra note 261, at 160. 
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also help explain the strong divergence in sentencing outcomes and, in 
particular, between rates of incarceration. U.S. and Australian literature 
on public attitudes to sentencing is remarkably similar, confirming that 
U.S. citizens are probably no more punitive in their attitudes than 
Australians.413 Although communities in each jurisdiction want offenders 
to receive appropriate punishment, they also want to see them 
rehabilitated and are happy for state budgets to be expended upon 
noncustodial programs as long as public safety is not compromised. 
Nonetheless, arguably there is a greater fear of perceived pathological 
and dangerous criminality in the United States, which has elevated the 
protection of public safety to a more dominant position in penal policy 
than is apparent in Australia.414 
In this Article, we have examined important aspects of the criminal 
justice systems in our nations apart from what we looked at in our earlier 
work. Once again, we continue to be struck by how the two nations 
approach problems from sharply different perspectives. We conclude, as 
in the earlier piece, that much-though not all--of that difference is 
traceable to the sense that Australian jurisprudence is official-centric 
while U.S. jurisprudence is rights-oriented. 
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